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General Introdoction
Abstract
In this thesis we set out to investigate the neural and behavioral correlates of mindfulness. The 
term “mindfulness” has been used in many different ways, however. Mindfulness has been 
variously defined as a set of cognitive functions, psychological factors, traits, skills or attitudes. 
A brief but comprehensive overview is therefore necessary. We will organize these different 
conceptualizations of mindfulness into a preliminary working model that will help parse this 
overview, while not presuming to be exhaustive or explanatory by itself. As we encounter different 
aspects of mindfulness it will also serve to provide suggestions for their interrelationships, to 
which we will return in the general discussion. In our overview we will start by describing how, 
from its historical roots in Buddhism, mindfulness has found its way into clinical interventions 
and experimental peer-reviewed papers. We will show that preliminary progress has been made 
by defining mindfulness and identifying associated psychological concepts. Most of this work has 
been done within the context of clinical interventions and has focused on outcome measures, 
without systematically investigating the functional mechanism underlying its salutary effects. 
Experimental neuroscience, on the other hand, has hypothesized nonreactivity and metacognitive 
monitoring as unique characteristics that distinguish mindfulness meditation from other meditation 
practices. Nonreactivity was conceived of as a disposition or ability to respond less automatically 
to thoughts and feelings, while metacognitive monitoring describes the ability to observe and reflect 
upon mental content or cognitive processes. These two aspects have received limited attention 
in experimental studies, preventing the evaluation of the potentially unique contribution of 
mindfulness to clinical interventions and experimental neuroscience in general. In the second 
and third chapter of this thesis we investigated the correlation between neural and behavioral 
measures of nonreactivity with the nonreactivity mindfulness trait. In the fourth and fifth chapter 
we developed a novel paradigm to study metacognitive monitoring and compared novice and highly 
experienced mindfulness meditators with Controls.
9
CHAPTER 1. General Introduction
Mindfulness in Buddhism
Although mindfulness is generally acknowledged to have originated in Buddhist meditative 
practices, it has become an integral part of today’s clinical practice, and a growing body of 
experimental work has made it a research topic in its own right. More often than not, therefore, 
the Buddhist origin of mindfulness has become at most a cursory note in the introduction section 
of scientifïc and clinical papers. For the purpose of this thesis, we could do the same. However, this 
would place us in danger of prematurely weaning research on mindfulness from a rich body of 
ideas, methods, and practical knowledge. Furthermore, its original practice provides a backdrop 
by which one can evaluate the depth of our own understanding, the potential of its practice and 
the problems we might face in understanding it.
Meditation (dhydnd) was certainly used to quiet the mind before the time of Sakyamuni1. Relics 
from the bronze age Indus Valley civilization indicated that they already practiced meditation 
(C ousins, 1994). Sakyamuni began practicing religious austerities under the guidance of one of 
the most famous teachers of that time (Arada Kalama). After many years of meditation practice 
and studying with another great meditation teacher (Udraka Ramaputra), he realized that when 
he emerged from the trance his mind was still buffeted by everyday problems. Meditation was 
useful in disciplining the mind, but the freedom he was seeking he beüeved, also had an aspect 
of understanding, which could only be realized through wisdom. Determining the exact content 
of the Sakyamuni’s erdightenment poses several major scholarly problems (Cousins (1994), p. 
27). What is important for our current understanding of mindfulness meditation is that against 
a climate of ascetic practices to calm the mind, he emphasized the necessity to confront and 
understand the reason we are distraught and distracted in the first place. He taught, therefore, 
an investigative meditation called Vipassana. Vipassana is a Pali word from the Sanskrit prefix 
vi- and verbal root pas. It is often translated as insight, although the in- prefix may be misleading. 
Vi in Indo-Aryan languages is equivalent to the Latin dis. The vi in vipassana may therefore 
mean to see into, or see through (G unaratana, 1993). It is this investigative context within which 
the use of insight-meditation has found its way into contemporary western society under the 
name of mindfulness. It expresses the view that our lack of understanding about our personal 
and existential predicament causes aversion and desire, which results in greed, hatred and in fact 
all restless, anxious, angry and depressed mental states. In this sense, what was founded in early 
Buddhism was a causal model of psychology and mental health that emphasizes self-investigation 
and responsibility for one’s mental well-being.
In the next four centuries after Gautama Buddha’s death, his ideas were developed and expanded
1 The historical Buddha (f ~480 BCE) is often referred to as Sakyamuni (the sage o f the Sakya or Sakia people). He was
bom into the Gautama clan. According to traditional accounts, his personal name before he left home to live a religious life was 
Siddhartha.
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by Buddhist meditation practitioners and scholars, resulting in three collections of writings called 
the Tipitaka or Three Baskets’. In one of these collections, the Abhidhamma Pitaka, we find an 
extensive treatise on mental factors which we would now call cognitive functions and metal states 
(Anuruddha & Bodhi, 2000). It is a conceptual cognitive framework of astonishing complexity, 
describing a causal model of mental processes that includes perception, feelings, recognition, 
intention and attention. Perhaps even more impressive than its scope, is its logical consistency. 
Mental functions and states are cross-referenced within a classification system that desctibes 
mutual causes, the ways in which mental factors are expressed and the functions they perform. 
Incredibly large and dense, the Abhidhamma is supplemented by explanatory commentaries such 
as the classical Abhidhamma Sangaha (Anuruddha & Bodhi, 2000). In the authoritative translation 
of the Abhidhamma Sangaha we find the Pali sati translated as mindfulness. It describes sati as 
follows: “The word sati derives from a root meaning ‘to remember,’ but as a mental factor it 
signifies presence of mind, attentiveness to the present, rather that the faculty of memory 
regarding the past. It has the characteristics of not wobbling, i.e. not floating away from the 
object. Its function is absence of confusion or non-forgetfulness. It is manifested as guardianship, 
or as the state of confronting an objective field. Its proximate cause is strong perception of the 
four foundations of mindfulness” (II-8, p. 86).
Interestingly, even when one disregards the idiosyncratic nomenclature, one notices that this 
description is not written for any obvious practical (i.e. therapeutic or spiritual) use. It is rather 
a second collection of writings, the Sutta Pitaka, that is explicitly didactic. In it one finds the 
descriptions of how to practice mindfulness meditation. In the famous Anapanasati Sutta, or 
Mindfulness of Breathing Sutta, the practitioner is required to find a quiet place, and to do the 
meditation in a straight posture: “There is the case where a monk, having gone to the wilderness, to 
the shade of a tree, or to an empty building, sits down folding his legs crosswise, holding his body 
erect, and setting mindfulness to the fore. Always mindful, he breathes in, mindful he breathes out.”2 
This is followed by instructions of what this mindfulness of breathing entails: “Breathing in 
long, he discerns, ‘I am breathing in long’. Breathing out long, he discerns, ‘I am breathing out 
long.’ Breathing in short, he discerns, ‘I am breathing in short’. Breathing out short, he discerns, ‘I 
am breathing out short.’ He trains himself, ‘I will breathe in sensitive to the entire body.’ He trains 
himself, ‘I will breathe out sensitive to the entire body.” The text then expands the instruction 
to include the observation of feelings, mental qualities and mental states, adding up to the “four 
foundations of mindfulness” mentioned earlier in the citation of the Abhidhamma Sangaha.
What becomes clear from juxtaposing these two descriptions of mindfulness, is that although 
they obviously refer to each other, they have been developed for very different purposes: on the 
one hand as a scholarly description of mindfulness as mental factor or function, and on the other
2 translated from Pali by Thanissaro Bhikkhu, http://www.accesstoinsight.org/tipitaka/mn/mn. 118.than.html
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hand as a very practical meditation instruction. In contemporary scientific literature this distinction 
between theoretical cognitive mechanisms and the actual practice of mindfulness meditation is 
rarely acknowledged but has determined to a large degree how the term mindfulness has been 
used. The resulting conceptualizations of mindfulness in experimental and clinical work seem 
therefore rather to diverge than converge in their understanding. The challenge in researching 
mindfulness is therefore perhaps not so much a potential incommensurability between Buddhist 
and western descriptions of mindfulness, but rather between strict cognitive definitions of 
mindfulness (as a cognitive function or ability), and the way they are developed and performed, (as 
behavior or as a cognitive-emotional set). It has, for instance, been argued that the ‘to remember’ 
in the Pali translation of sati, probably means to remember to remain aware and can therefore be best 
translated as “to be mindful” instead (Batchelor, 1997). Similarly, G rossman &  V an D am  (2011) 
argue that the use of the noun “mindfulness” too easily implies a fixed trait, when it should more 
accurately be seen as a (lifelong) practice. In this thesis we will repeatedly encounter this problem 
as mindfulness will be defined either as a set of cognitive functions, a trait, a meditation or a 
clinical intervention. We will distinguish different uses of the term mindfulness when needed, 
and clarify their function by explicating their relationship with other concepts using the working 
model depicted in Figure 1.
Mindfulness Meditation
Open Monitoring
Focused Attention
Figure 1. Schematic outline of mindfulness meditation describing the relationship between the psychological 
concepts and cognitive functions used in clinical research, clinical practice and experimental Science.
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Mindfulness in clinical interventions
Paramount to the successful introduction of mindfulness into the contemporary western world 
has been the explicit ‘stripping away’ of its Buddhist context. In the words of Jon Kabat-Zinn: 
“Mindfulness is often spoken of as the heart of Buddhist meditation. It’s not about Buddhism, 
but about paying attention. That’s what all meditation is, no matter what tradition or particular 
technique is used.”3 In 1979, Kabat-Zinn started the Mindfulness Based Stress Reduction program 
(MBSR) at the Stress Reduction Clinic at the University of Massachusetts Medical Centre. Based 
largely on this MBSR, a Mindfulness Based Cognitive Therapy (MBCT) was later developed to 
prevent relapse in recurrently depressed patients (Teasdale, Segal, & Williams, 1995; Teasdale 
e t  al., 2000). Although the MBCT, MBSR, Dialectic Behavioral Therapy (DBT, see Robins & 
Chapman, 2004) and Acceptance and Commitment Therapy (ACT, see Hayes, Luoma, Bond, 
Masuda & Lillis, 2006) are probably most widely known to the scientific community, these 
programs are certainly not the only ones that have integrated mindfulness in clinical interventions. 
In fact one could talk of a “third wave of behavioral therapy” that emphasizes mindfulness and 
acceptance, and is generally oriented more towards experiential than didactic practices (Hayes, 
2004).
MBCT and MBSR are group interventions that last eight to ten weeks. They consist of weekly 
sessions lasting about two hours, along with a single all-day class. Much of the practice is done 
outside of classes, however. Formal meditation occurs at home via CD’s of guided meditations 
in which one is instructed to focus on bodily sensations and to respond to distractions in a 
focused but nonjudgmental way. This is done for periods of increasing duration, starting with 10 
minutes during the first days, and increasing gradually to 45 minutes in the last week. Teasdale 
and colleagues (1995) explain formal meditation as follows: “In formal mindfulness practice, the 
student sits quietly in an erect and dignified posture and attempts, non-strivingly, to maintain 
attention on a particular focus, commonly breathing When attention wanders from the breath 
to the thoughts and feelings that inevitably arise, the student ‘acknowledges and accepts’ the 
thoughts and feelings and gently redirects attention back to the breath. This procedure is repeated 
many tirnes, whenever the student notices that the attention has wandered” (p. 33). Participants 
are also required to find moments throughout their day when they can do a short three-minute 
mindful breathing exercise. They are further instructed to find a regular physical daily activity that 
they can perform with similar attention and attitude, such as brushing their teeth or walking to 
work. In MBSR, and especially in MBCT, some form of psycho-education is provided as well, 
consisting mainly in explaining two alternative psychological modes by which one can respond 
to distressing experiences: either through reacting (without thinking or awareness) or by responding 
(considering the situation before choosing a productive response).
3 TIME magazine, January 11, 2012
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Defining mindfulness
While evidence that mindfulness based interventions can help a broad range of individuals 
cope with their clinical and nonclinical problems is accumulating (Baer, 2003; C hiesa &  
Serreth , 2009, 2010b; G rossman , N iemann, Schmidt, &  W alach , 2004; H ofmann, Sawyer, 
W itt, & Oh, 2010), most studies suffer from methodological limitations and the lack of 
active Controls. Importandy, effectiveness trials of mindfulness are far from identifying 
mechanisms by which mindfulness works, with theoretical and methodological advances lagging 
behind. In the words of Bishop and colleagues (2004): “As long as questions concerning 
construct specificity and operational definitions remain unaddressed it is not possible to 
undertake important investigations into the mediating role and mechanisms of acrion of 
mindfulness or to develop instruments that allow such investigations to proceed” (p. 231). A 
decade earlier, Kabat-Zinn (1994) did provide a concise definition of mindfulness: “paying 
attention in a particular way: on purpose, in the present moment, and nonjudgmentally” 
What Bishop and colleagues (2004) are referring to, is that such a definition does not, by itself, 
provide hypotheses about the cognitive mechanisms that underlie its salutary effects. Without 
such explicit proposals, it remains unclear how to go about testing its therapeutic claims. In a first 
attempt to operationalize mindfulness meditation, they suggest two components of mindfulness. 
The first is present-moment attention, operationalized as sustained attention, attention switching, 
and the inhibition of elaborative processing (i.e. inhibiting thoughts about experience). In this 
context they consider mindfulness a metacognitive skill, as it requires both cognitive control and 
monitoring of the stream of consciousness. The second component they propose is “a particular 
orientation toward one’s experiences in the present moment characterized by curiosity, openness 
and acceptance (...) involving the conscious decision to abandon one’s agenda to have a different 
experience and an active process of ‘allowing’ current thoughts, feelings and sensations”. They 
suggest that such experiential curiosity and openness should result in a decreased repressive 
coping style, increased dispositional openness and improved affect tolerance. Furthermore, they 
conceptualize mindfulness as a process of investigative awareness that involves observing the 
ever-changing flow of private experience. This would lead to increased cognitive complexity, e.g. 
the ability to differentiate feelings from bodily sensations and to describe the complex nature of 
emotional states. As such, mindfulness would be positively correlated with measures of emotional 
awareness and negatively correlated with measures of alexithymia. Similarly, a greater capacity to 
see relationships between thoughts, feelings and actions would be correlated positively with the 
ability for self-examination.
Mindfulness as a tooi
This emphasis on the investigative use of mindfulness meditation clearly echoes the Buddhist
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vipasanna practice and positions mindfulness practice within a process-oriented therapeutic 
context. However, reminiscent of the Buddhist distinction with sati, the first part of the definition 
offered by Bishop and colleagues (2004) describes mindfulness as a set of basic cognitive functions 
related to attention. Mindfulness is therefore defined on two different levels of description but 
without a description of how these levels might interact to result in therapeutic outcomes. For 
this, we will return to a description of the mindfulness practice in clinical interventions. We will 
take the MBCT as an example, but suggest that a similar approach is taken in other mindfulness 
based interventions. The MBCT is based on the idea that depressed patients in remission are 
likely to revert to destructive ruminations once a negative mood returns, resulting in a vicious 
circle of negative thoughts and feelings (Teasdale et al ., 1995). Although this can be explained 
by the therapist intellectually, mindfulness meditation is thought to enable the patiënt to become 
personally aware of these mechanisms as they happen. This would enable them to undertake 
measures to prevent themselves from getting caught up in them. Importantly, this is not the 
end of the practice. The patients are taught to apply more productive (i.e. nonreactive) attitudes 
towards negative experiences during meditation so that they can experience the benefits first- 
hand, preparing them for real life contingencies. In a very literal way, therefore, mindfulness 
should be considered a tooi rather than an end in itself. Patients must make an commitment 
to use this tooi appropriately, namely by attending to spontaneous experiences that might not 
be pleasant, expected or understood. In doing so, patients learn which attitudes enable such 
an investigation, and can practice those that improve their well-being. The calm, nonreactive, 
nonjudgmental attitudes that are developed through mindfulness meditation can therefore 
be considered both as necessary attitudes for meditation practice, as well as a specific skill set 
that can be practiced to improve well-being. Mindfulness meditation therefore consists of the 
repeated application of a set of cognitive functions (present-moment attention) for the purpose 
of discovering beneficial (i.e. nonreactive) attitudes towards experience. In our model (Figure 
1), the (negative) experiences are put under box E, the metacognitive investigation under box F, 
and the modulating attitudes under box C. We will discuss the attentional system at length in the 
second section of the introduction.
Mindfulness as a trait
Although mindfulness has been described in terms of present-moment attention and mindful 
attitudes, much questionnaire work has been done on mindful traits. In questionnaire research, 
mindfulness is regarded as an inherent capacity that is expressed amongst individuals in a greater 
or lesser degrees (Brown &  R yan, 2003; J. Kabat-Z inn, 2003; K uheman, 2002). The idea is that 
some people might be naturally inclined to be more mindful in daily life, while others are less so. 
Generally, these questionnaires conceptualize mindfulness as a trait that consists of psychological
15
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characteristics that are considered important in mindfulness meditation or mindfulness based 
interventions. They are therefore designed for and administered to non-meditator samples. These 
questionnaire studies have several methodological limitations. First, because few people in the 
general population understand what the term “mindful” means or attribute to it a wide range 
o f meanings, there is little use in asking explicitly how mindful they believe they are. To address 
this problem, questionnaires are phrased in ordinary language to ensure people do not need to 
understand the underlying concepts, and are not required to notice mindful aspects in their daily 
functioning. Often reverse-scored items are used, as experiences o f mindlessness (doing things 
automatically) are considered to be more easily recognized. These questionnaires therefore only 
address hypothesized effects o f a mindful disposition in ordinary daily experience and behavior. 
Second, most mindfulness questionnaires aim at measuring different factors, or elements of 
mindfulness, but the vast majority ends up collapsing all items (questions) into one general score. 
Thus, important distinctions between various aspects o f mindfulness are obscured. Third, although 
questionnaires treat mindfulness as a dispositional trait, there is little evidence that mindfulness is, 
in fact, consistent over time and across situations. To the best o f our knowledge, only a single test- 
retest reliability o f trait mindfulness has been reported so far, which did show good to excellent 
performance (Veehof, Ten Klooster, Taal, W esterhof, & Bohlmeijer, 2011). Fourth, and 
perhaps most problematic, is the fact that mindfulness questionnaires operationalize mindfulness 
differently. The Freiburg Mindfulness Inventory (FMI; Büchheld, Grossman, & W alach, 2001) 
was originally developed with participants in mindfulness meditation retreats and was designed 
to be used with experienced meditators. A  later version o f the FMI was developed for non- 
meditating populations (Walach, Buchheld, Buttenmuller, Kleinknecht, & Schmidt, 2006). 
In contrast, the Kentucky Inventory o f Mindfulness Skills (KIMS, Baer, Smtth, & Allen, 2004) 
and Cognitive and Affective Mindfulness Scale—Revised (Feldman, Hayes, Kumar, Greeson, & 
Laurenceau, 2007) are mainly based on the mindfulness skills described in the DBT programs 
and later adapted to be consistent with the MBSR and MBCT. The Southampton Mindfulness 
Questionnaire (Chadwick et al., 2008) specifïcally measures mindfulness responses to unpleasant 
response while the Mindful Attention Awareness Scale (MAAS, Brown & Ryan, 2003) measures 
characteristics that are considered inconsistent with mindfulness and then reverses the scores. In 
chapter 1 and 2 we have used the Five Factor Mindfulness Questionnaire (FFMQ, Baer et al.,
2006) which is the result o f a factor analysis o f these five previously developed questionnaires. 
Its subscales are: Observing (noticing or attending to internal and external experiences, such 
as sensations, cognitions, emotions, sights, sounds, and smells), Describing (labelling internal 
experiences with words), Acting with awareness (attending to one’s activities o f the moment in 
contrast with behaving mechanically while attention is focused elsewhere), Nonjudging (taking 
a non-evaluative stance toward thoughts and feelings) and Nonreactivity (allowing thoughts and 
feelings to come and go, without getting caught up in or carried away by them).
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F reiburg  M in d fulness Inventory  
“I am open to the experience of the present moment.”
“I sense my body, whether eating, cooking, cleaning, or talking.”
“When I notice an absence of mind I gendy return to the experience of the here and now.”
M in d fu l  A tten tio n  A w areness S cale  
“I find myself doing things without paying attention. “(R)
“I break or spill things because of not paying attention, or thinking of something else.” (R)
“It seems I am “running on automatic” without much awareness of what I’m doing.” (R)
K en tu ck y  In ven to ry  of M in d fulness S kills 
“When I’m walking, I deüberately notice the sensations of my body moving.”
‘Tm good at findings the words to describe my feelings.”
“When I do things, my mind wanders off and I’m easily distracted.” (R)
“I teil myself that I shouldn’t be feeling the way Fm feeling.” (R)
C o gn itive  a n d  A ffecitv e  M indfulness S ca le  -  R evised  
“I am able to focus on the present moment.”
“I am preoccupied by the past.“ (R)
“I am able to accept the thoughts and feelings I have.”
SOUTHAMPTON MINDFULNESS QUESTIONNAIRE 
“When I have distressing thoughts or images, I am able just to notice them without reacting.” 
“When I have distressing thoughts or images, I judge the thought or image as good or bad.“ (R) 
“When I have distressing thoughts or images, in my mind I try and push them away.“ (R)
F ive  F a cet  M in d fulness Q uestionnaire  
This is a composite of the preceding five questionnaires and includes items from each.
Figure 2. Mindfulness questionnaires and example items. R = reverse-scored item. Adapted from B aer ,
2011.
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Although factor analysis suggest that these are facets of an overall mindfulness construct 
(Baer et al ., 2006; B aer et al ., 2008), no suggestions are made as to how these would interact 
to produce a mindful trait. The first three factors clearly describe metacognitive monitoring, 
while the latter two correspond to attitudes or cognitive sets. This suggests that the distinction 
between metacognitive monitoring and attitudes we have been making remains important when 
considering traits.
There is some evidence that the FFMQ captures a tendency of people to “be mindful” in daily life. 
It correlates positively with Standard personality traits such as openness to experience, and correlates 
negatively with neuroticism and absent-mindedness. It also correlates negatively with clinically 
relevant traits such as difficulties in emotional regulation and alexithymia (Baer et al ., 2006;
2008). Participants in MBSR and MBCT have shown significant increases in mindfulness scores 
over the course of treatment, suggesting that they can learn ‘to be more mindful’ in daily life 
and that mindfulness questionnaire are able to measure this progress (Carmody & Baer, 2008; 
K uyken et a l ., 2010). Furthermore, Carmody and Baer (2008) found that improvements in self- 
reported mindfulness were strongly correlated with time spent in home mindfulness practice and 
with the extent of reduction in psychological symptoms and stress. Statistical analyses suggested 
that it was the increase in mindfulness skills brought about by home practice that was responsible 
for the improvements. Similarly, depressed persons who completed MBCT showed increases 
in mindfulness skills that predicted reduced depression 15 months later (K uyken, Crane, & 
D algleish, 2012). These findings provide the first empirical evidence for the idea that practicing 
mindfulness leads to increased mindfulness in daily life, which in turn reduces psychological 
suffering.
However, the presumptive mindfulness traits m ap  only indirectly onto the concept of mindfulness 
that is defined in terms of an accepting present-moment awareness. Neither does a description 
of mindfulness in terms of traits provide a mechanism by which these traits could be developed. 
At least not without resorting to a trivial definition of mindfulness practice, i.e. practicing those 
personality characteristic that are deemed mindful. We can clarify this issue by expanding our 
model and describing mindful traits (box D) as a disposition to express mindful attitudes (box C). 
These traits cannot be considered to completely determine the expression of mindful attitudes, 
as this would make any change impossible. We emphasize instead, that mindful attitudes can 
be expressed even when one is predisposed against them. Furthermore, through repeated use 
of mindful attitudes, they might become habituated, resulting in more productive, i.e. mindful, 
mental habits (box C to box D).
18
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Following these rather detailed descriptions, we can summarize the different ways by which 
mindfulness is used in clinical research.
1. Mindfulness as a tooi, or set of attentional and metacognitive functions used for the 
introspective investigation of present moment experiences
2. Mindfulness meditation as the repeated application of (1)
3. Mindful attitudes as cognitive-emotional sets that enable (2)
4. Mindful traits and skills as those dispositions towards — or skills in - performing (3)
We can now provide a more comprehensive descriptdon of mindfulness that integrates all of 
these different ways in it is used: Mindfulness is the metacognitive control o f  attention towards - and the 
monitoring o f  -present moment experiences, occurring in association with a mindful attitude that is conducive to 
its investigation, where discovery and practice o f  mindful attitudes are the primary vehicle o f  therapeutic change, 
and where the ability and tendency to use these attitudes is a function o f  its trait. Furthermore, as a long-term 
consequence of this practice, the expression of a mindful attitude might become habituated and 
promote further well-being.
The process described in the model is repeated many times within a single meditation session. 
This is why in the model an intentionalaspect of the meditation is included (box B). Mindfulness 
meditation can be a disquieting and often unpleasant experience. It is not undertaken as an quick 
escape from negative conditions, but as an experiential practice that provides the practitioner 
with insight into the causes of suffering and enables the exploration of self-regulation strategies. 
A commitment to maintain this meditative practice, for these reasons, we deem essential for 
any long term positive outcome to occur. In other words, only with the appropriate intention will 
the separate aspects of mindfulness be organized into a mindfulness meditation practice (i.e. 
Vipasanna).
Finally, for the sake of completeness the schema also allows for the inclusion of those aspects 
that are associated with mindfulness meditation in the original Buddhist context, such as its 
moral and soteriological motivations. However, we hereby suggest, together with modern secular 
scholars (i.e. Batchelor (1997) andj. K abat-Zinn (2003)), that these are not essential aspects of 
the mindfulness practice.
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Neuroscience of meditation
We have described how mindfulness meditation has been used in the clinical context in some 
detail, describing its main concepts and proposing a preliminary framework for understanding its 
salutary effects. We have seen that clinical research on mindfulness has suffered from being focused 
primarily on outcomes rather than on processes or mechanism of change. To gain a mechanistic 
understanding of mindfulness meditation, experimental neuroscience is indispensable, e.g. to test 
specific claims of long-term effects on cognition and affect regulation. More importantly, without 
direct evidence for the involvement of neural mechanisms that define mindfulness meditation, 
our understanding of its mechanisms and outcomes will remain subjective and inferential.
We will first give a short overview of the neuroscience of meditation and discuss recent 
theoretical advances that propose a set of cognitive functions that can distinguish mindfulness 
meditation from other forms of meditation. Neuroscience has long been a topic of fascination for 
researchers, proceeding the current popularity of mindfulness by decades. Mostly neuroscience 
on meditation has focused on state or trait effects on the brain. A seminal review by Cahn and 
Polich (2006), spanning over 50 years of electroencephalography and neuroimaging studies on 
meditation found the field in a sorry state. They identified a general lack of standardized designs 
for assessing meditation effects across studies, a wide variety of different meditation techniques 
used, and a lack of technical expertise, especially in earlier studies. Considerable discrepancy 
amongst results prevented them from formulating convincing conclusions. Only the most 
tentative observation was made that many studies showed a general increase in alpha power 
during meditation compared to control tasks, and that similar effects were reported as long-term 
effects. Given that increases in alpha have traditionally been associated with decreases in arousal, 
it remained an open question whether these findings show specific effects of meditation beyond 
those resultant from relaxation. The authors proposed that only a fine-grained topographical 
mapping could resolve this issue. Four years later these conclusions were repeated in a review 
of cognitive and neuroimaging results in which only controlled and cross-sectional studies of 
mindfulness meditation were included (Chiesa & Serrjbtti, 2010b). In addition, they reported that 
long-term meditation was associated with an enhancement of cerebral areas related to attention 
(the prefrontal cortex and anterior cingulate cortex), which suggests that mindfulness meditation 
is an active attentional practice.
Focused Attention versus Open Monitoring
In the same year as Cahn and Polich’s massive overview, Lutz, Dunne and Davidson 
published an infiuential chapter called “Meditation as the Neuroscience of Consciousness”, 
published in the Cambridge Handbook of Consciousness (2006). In a monumental cross-
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disciplinary effort, they reviewed different Buddhist meditation techniques in both scholarly 
and experiential detail, and provided an overview and taxonomy of meditation techniques 
for future neuroscientific research. The taxonomy is largely based on the relationship 
between attention and the object of attention. Mindfulness (Vipasanna) meditation is placed 
between two poles of practice they describe as focused attention (FA) and open monitoring 
(OM): “... on the one hand, one pointed-attention techniques cultivates a form of voluntary, 
effortful and sustained attention on an object [FA], and on the other hand vipasanna meditation 
cultivates a more broadly focused, non-judgmental mode of bare attention [OM]. (,.)The emphasis 
on stabilizing the mind on an object [FA] or on the awareness of the intentional relation itself 
[OM] depends on the given technique but also, likely, on the degree of accomplishment of the 
practitioner in a given practice”. In a later publication, Lutz et al. (2008) offers the following 
summary:
Focused Attention meditation (FA)
0 Directing and sustaining attention on a selected object (e.g. breath sensation)
0 Detecting mind-wandering and distractors (e.g. thoughts)
0 Disengagement of attention from distractors and shifting of attention back to the 
selected object
0 Cognitive reappraisal of distractors, e.g. “just a thought” and “it is okay to be distracted”
Open Monitoring meditation (OM)
0 No explicit focus on objects
0 Nonreactive meta-cognitive monitoring (e.g. for novices, labeling of experience)
0 Nonreactive awareness of automatic cognitive and emotional interpretations of 
sensory, perceptual and endogenous stimuli.
The model in Figure 1 shows how FA consists of attentional control mechanisms (box G, Figure 
1) for the purpose of sustaining attention on the intended object, typically the sensations of the 
breath (box I). Once attention is drawn towards a distracting thought or feeling (box E), it is 
returned back to the intended object. In OM, however, the new object of attention is attended 
to (thought, feeling or sensation) for as long as it is presents itself to conscious awareness. In 
our model the unintended object of attention is therefore placed outside of FA, and inside OM. 
Furthermore, as a certain degree of focused and sustained attention is necessary for OM to occur, 
FA is subsumed under OM. OM distinguishes itself from FA by an additional metacognitive 
monitoring of the intentional relationship with the objects of attention (Box F). In other words, 
OM consists of a conscious monitoring of shifts in attention, allowing the observation and
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investigation of the push-and-pull of experiential events. Note that in their description of OM, 
Lutz and coUeagues (L u tz  e t  a l ., 2006) used the term nonreactive. Although nonreactive monitoring 
is an important aspect of OM, similarly as in Bishop (B ish o p  e t  a l ., 2004), such a description 
creates a categorical confusion by coupling a cognitive function with a trait or attitude. Our model 
clarifies the issue by explicating their relationship with the distracting experience (Box E to Box 
D , and box D  to Box C). In other words, how the experience it is likely to be processed (if at all) 
is not a property of metacognitive awareness but depends on the individual’s reactive trait and 
attitude. It is at this dispositional level that mindful traits describe the tendency to remain attentive 
to experience, and engage continued metacognitive awareness. If the person has a nonreactive 
disposition, the experience has more chance of being attended to. If instead the person has a 
tendency to respond to experiences ‘on automatic pilot’, the distracting experience will trigger 
further thoughts and feelings that will disengage the tentatively maintained attention, resulting in 
a loss of metacognitive awareness.
The authors also suggest that the degree to which either FA or OM is emphasized in the meditation 
practice is dependent on the accomplishment of the meditator. Indeed, traditional mindfulness 
meditation progresses from an emphasis on an object of attention to the intentional relationship 
with experience. For instance, in intensive vipasanna retreats, the first days are typically spent 
solely on focusing attention to sensations of the breath (S a y a d a w , A g g a c i t t a ,  &  W h e e l e r ,  2001). 
The purpose of this initial practice is to create a necessary degree of attentional stability so that 
attention can be ‘anchored’ onto experiences that occur in the present moment, instead of on 
thoughts and feelings about them. A  degree of sustained attention is also needed to recognize 
sensations, thoughts and feelings when they occur. Gradually, the priority of this ‘anchor’ of 
attention can be released and former distractors included in the practice of mindful observation. 
Novice meditators often start by mentally noting their experiences using simple verbal labels 
(e.g. “hearing”, “feeling”, “thinking”) to maintain awareness of what is going on and to reduce 
mental and emotional elaboration. Finally, experiences can be merely noted, and attention is 
given more to the intentional relationship the meditator has with experience (rather than with 
the objects of experience). These later metacognitive stages are not achieved by everyone as 
easily within the time span of a mindfulness intervention, or within a single vipassana retreat. 
The fact that the effects of OM are expected to occur only after extensive practice might explain 
the inconsistency in top-tiered neuroscience publications that, while referring to the distinction 
between FA and OM, classify mindfulness meditation FA. (H a se n k a m p , W i l s o n - M e n d e n h a l l ,  
D u n c a n ,  &  B a r s a l o u ,  2012; L u t z  e t  a l . ,  2009a; S l a g t e r  e t  a l . ,  2007). In fact, in a recent review 
on the cognitive benefits of mindfulness meditation, Chiesa and colleagues (2011)4 showed 
that moderately brief mindfulness training (an eight week meditation program or a short-term
4 4515 studies on mindfulness, vipasanna and Zen were found until May 2010. 35 published papers investigated cognitive
correlates o f mindfulness meditation o f which 23 were finally included in the meta-analysis.
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retreat) only improved selective and sustained attention abilities. However, a majority of reviewed 
studies found significantly higher attentional abilities in long term mindfulness meditators as 
compared with matched Controls as well as a significant positive relationship between total hours 
of meditation experience and attentional abilities. Chiesa et al. (2011) therefore suggested that, 
while there was evidence for increased abilities with FA meditation, effects related to OM might 
only develop as a result of extensive mindfulness training.
Summary and outline of thesis
We have given an overview of the ways in which mindfulness has been conceptualized and 
measured, from its Buddhist origins to contemporary clinical and neuroscientific research. We 
have shown that mindfulness is generally understood to consist of two aspects that distinguish 
it from mere Focused Attention, namely, nonreactivity and metacognitive monitoring. These were also 
argued to be essential for its clinical potential. Nonreactivity was described as a disposition or 
attitude to respond less automatically to experience. Metacognitive monitoring describes the ability to 
observe and reflect upon mental content or cognitive processes. Furthermore, we integrated all 
the relevant clinical and cognitive aspects of mindfulness in a preliminary model of mindfulness 
meditation.
The aim of this thesis is to investigate the behavioral and neural correlates of these two 
distinguishing aspects of mindfulness. In the first two studies we investigated whether the 
mindfulness trait correlated with objective measures of (non)reactivity. In the first study we 
measured automatic somatosensory responses to the observation of painful images. In the second, 
we measured the tendency to respond habitually to unconsciously acquired preferences. In the 
third study we developed a paradigm that could objectively measure metacognitive monitoring 
of the ongoing attentional state, in a experiment that simulated mindfulness meditation. In our 
last chapter we used this paradigm to compare Controls with novice and expert meditators, to 
test whether extensive mindfulness meditation increases the ability for metacognitive monitoring.
Second chapter
The mindfulness trait is assumed to reflect a tendency to react less automatically to affective 
experiences. Previous research suggests that observing pain in others automatically activates 
the somatosensory cortex. By measuring somatosensory alpha suppression using magneto- 
encephalography, we measured the automatic activation of bodily representations in response 
to the observation of painful images. We sought evidence for an individual trait of reactivity 
by correlating the degree of somatosensory alpha suppression with the Interpersonal Reactivity 
Index (Davis, 1983) and the Five Factor Mindfulness Questionnaire (Baer et ai.. 2006).
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Thitd chapter
Much of our actions are habitual, performed automatically and without conscious awareness. 
Many of these are complex skills, such as language or riding a bike, which we can acquire 
implicitly, without conscious intention. Such implicit knowledge is expressed though habitual 
responses that are often hard to inhibit. In the second chapter we investigated whether the 
nonreactive mindfulness trait would correlate negatively with the tendency to respond habitually 
to such implicit knowledge. Participants performed a working memory task in which they were, 
unknowingly, exposed to complex regularities. It is a well-established finding that participants 
remain naive about the existence of these underlying regularities. However, when asked, they 
show a preference for similar regularities above those that violate them. We hypothesized that 
participants who display a more mindful disposition would base their preference less on these 
implicit representations.
Fourth chapter
In the third chapter we developed a novel paradigm to measure metacognitive awareness of 
attention. Specifically, we tested whether participants were able to report on their degree of 
present-moment attentional focus. For this purpose, we measured magnetoencephalography 
while participants were attending covertly to either their left or right hand. At unpredictable 
moments participants were probed to report on their attentional state at that moment using a 
button press. We hypothesized that higher self-reported attention would correspond to lower 
contralateral alpha power. Furthermore, we predicted that a correspondence between alpha 
power and reported attentional state would be specific for the contralateral hemisphere but would 
not occur, or occur less, with ipsilateral alpha power. This would indicate that participants would 
indeed report specifically on attentional focus, rather than on a general attentional state or state of 
arousal.
Fifth chapter
In the fourth chapter we used the experimental paradigm developed in the previous chapter 
to investigate the effect of mindfulness meditation experience on the ability for metacognitive 
awareness of attention. We compared mindfulness meditators with a control group. Furthermore, 
within the meditation group, we compared those that had considerably more extensive meditation 
experience with novice meditators. We hypothesized that meditators would display a greater 
ability to accurately report on present-moment attentional focus than Controls. Furthermore, we 
expected mindfulness meditators to show more consistent differences in contralateral alpha power 
over time, i.e. between ‘good’ versus ‘bad’ trials. Furthermore, we expected these differences to be 
expressed more strongly by expert meditators as compared to novice meditators.
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Sensorimotor alpha activity is modulated in response 
to the observation of pain5
Abstract
The perception-action account of empathy states that observation of another person’s state 
automatically activates a similar state in the observer. It is still unclear in what way ongoing 
sensorimotor alpha oscillatdons are involved in this process. Although they have been repeatedly 
implicated in (biological) action observation and understanding communicative gestures, less 
is known about their role in vicarious pain observation. Their role is understood to provide a 
graded inhibition through functional inhibition, thereby streamlining information flow through 
the cortex. Although alpha oscillations have been shown to have at least visual and sensorimotor 
origins, only the latter are expected to be involved in the empathetic response. Here, we used 
magnetoencephalography (MEG), allowing us to spatially distinguish and localize oscillatory 
components using beamformer source reconstruction. Subjects observed realistic pictures of 
limbs in painful and no-pain (control) conditions. As predicted, time-frequency analysis indeed 
showed increased alpha suppression in the pain condition compared to the no-pain condition. 
Although both pain and no-pain conditions suppressed alpha and beta band activity at both 
posterior and central sensors, the pain condition suppressed alpha more only at central sensors. 
Source reconstruction localized these differences along the central sulcus. Our results could not 
be accounted for by differences in the evoked fields, suggesting a unique role of oscillatory 
activity in empathetic responses. We argue that alpha oscillations provide a unique measure of 
the underlying functional architecture of the brain, suggesting an automatic disinhibition of the 
sensorimotor cortices in response to the observation of pain in others.
5 Based on: Whitmarsh S, Nieuwenhuis ILC, Barendregt HP and Jensen O (2011) Sensorimotor alpha activity is modulated
in response to the observation of pain in others. Front. Hum. Neurosci. 5:91.
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Introduction
When seeing a football player receive a painful tackle we cringe and might even grasp our own 
knee in affective resonance with the victim’s painful state. This phenomenon o f vicarious pain 
experience is explained in the perception-action account o f empathy: “The attended perception 
of the object’s state automatically activates the subject’s representation o f the state, situation, 
and object, and the activation o f these representations automatically primes or generates the 
associated autonomie and somatic responses, unless inhibited” (Preston & de W aal, 2002).
The perception-action account o f empathy for pain has been greatly expanded upon in the last 
decade, resulting in a nuanced neuroscientific framework that integrates knowledge o f affective 
and perception-action processes with an understanding o f the influences o f social context, 
expectation and attention (for a comprehensive review on its evolutionary basis and social 
expression in humans and animals see Preston and de Waal (2002) and for a systematic review 
on the neuroscience o f empathy see de Vignemont and Singer (2006), Singer (2006) and Decety 
and Jackson (2004)). De Vignemont and Singer (2006) offer a precise definition o f empathy, 
distinguishing it from cognitive perspective-taking on the one hand and emotional contagion 
on the other. They characterize empathy as being in an affective state isomorphic to another 
person’s affective state, elicited by observation or imagination o f another person’s affective state, 
but without losing the understanding that it is the other person’s affective state that is the cause o f 
one’s own. Two important remarks should be made, however, in light o f the current experiment. 
First o f all, the focus on the affective response should not ignore the importance o f sensory 
processes, as we shall see. Secondly, although empathy is certainly not restricted to the sharing 
o f negate affective states, most neuroscientific investigations, this one included, have used the 
observation o f pain as a model to test the notion o f shared representations in empathy. Indeed, it 
has been firmly established that the observation o f pain in others involves a network o f affective 
brain regions, such as the anterior cingulate, paracingulate gyrus and anterior insular, that are also 
activated duringthe first-person experience o f pain (Ingvar, 1999; Rainville, 2002). Furthermore, 
responses in these regions have been found using a wide variety o f paradigms, from presenting 
abstract cues o f other people in pain (Jackson et al., 2005; Saarela et al., 2007; Singer et 
al., 2004), to pictures o f body parts being pin-pricked (Lamm, Nusbaum, Meltzoff, & Decety,
2007) and painful facial expressions (Jabbi & K eysers, 2008). Empathetic responses in these 
brain regions have, furthermore, been shown to be influenced by social contexts such as group 
membership and perceived fairness (Hein, Silani, Preuschoff, Batson, & Singer, 2010) as well 
as task demands and knowledge about the reality o f the stimulus (Gu & Han, 2007). Often, but 
less consistently, primary somatosensory regions are found to be involved, which seems to depend 
on the availability o f the sensory information about the painful stimulus. In their meta-analysis 
of nine fMRI experiments, Lamm, Decety and Singer (2011) showed that vicarious activation of 
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the somatosensory cortex seems oniy to occur when visual details of the flesh-and-bone aspect 
of the painful situation are observed, not when these are inferred from abstract cues. The authors 
propose, however, that this somatosensory activation reflects unspecific co-activation elicited by 
the visual displ ay of body parts rather than a specific matching of the other’s somatosensory and 
nociceptive state. This is in line with their aforementioned characterization of empathy as, first 
and foremost, an affective state. Other authors, however, have argued for the functional importance 
of primary sensory cortices as part of the empathetic (pain) response, subserving pain-intensity 
and location coding (Keysers, Kaas, & Gazzola, 2010). Interestingly, in this respect individual 
propensities differ greatly, as shown by Osborn and Derbyshire (2010). They reported that 
those people that respond to painful images by experiencing a ‘real’ sensation of pain, show 
activation of somatosensory cortices, while these regions are not activated in those that do not 
have such first-person experiences. Further evidence for the involvement of sensory cortices in 
pain observation comes from electroencephalography (EEG) studies. Bufalari and colleagues
(2007) recorded a reduction of early sensory evoked potentials after medial nerve stimulation 
when subjects were watching movies of limbs in painful situations (Blakemore, Bristow, Bird, 
Frith, & Ward, 2005). Pain systems are also tighdy linked to action systems (Farina, et al., 2003; 
Ingvar, 1999; Juottonen et al., 2002; Saitoh, et ai.., 1999; Wager et al., 2004), and it has been 
repeatedly shown that observation of painful movies strongly inhibits corticospinal excitability 
specific for the muscle that was observed being pinpricked (Avenanti, et al., 2005, 2006, 2009). 
These findings together suggest that primary sensorimotor regions are indeed involved in the 
empathetic response in ways that entails more than a-specific increases in arousal.
Questions of when empathetic responses occur have been investigated using electro­
encephalography scalp recordings (EEG). Fan and Han (2008) found larger early (140-380 ms) 
frontal event-related potentials (ERPs) amplitudes in response to pictures of limbs in painful 
situations compared to those in control situations. These early empathie responses were influenced 
by contextual reality (real pictures versus cartoons). Later (380-500 ms) central-parietal effects 
of pain that were prominent in a pain judgment task, were greatly reduced when subjects only 
had to count the number of limbs. This shows that the empathetic response can be modulated 
at different times, due to different task contexts, in line with a model of empathy that permits 
modulation of an automatic perception-action response at multiple stages (de Vignemont & 
Singer, 2006). Frequency analysis of EEG and magnetoencephalography (MEG) recordings 
has also been a particularly successful tooi in studying the involvement of the sensorimotor 
system in action, touch and pain observation. Alpha (—10 Hz) and beta (~20Hz) oscillations 
originating from the sensorimotor cortex (Hari & Salmeun, 1997) have been implicated in action 
observation (Caetano, J ousmaki, & Hari, 2007; Cochin, et al., 1999; Hari et al., 1998; Holz, 
et al., 2008; Jarvelainen et al., 2001; Kilner, Marchant, & Frith, 2006; K oelewijn et al.,
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2008; Muthukumaraswamy & J ohnson, 2004; Muthukumaraswamy, J ohnson, & McNair, 2004; 
Nakamura et al., 2004; Oberman, Pineda, & Ramachandran, 2007; Pineda, 2005; Rossi et al., 
2002; van Elk et al., 2008) recognizing point-light biological motion (Ulloa & Pineda, 2007), as 
well as in understanding communicative gestures (Nakamura et al., 2004). Muthukumaraswamy 
and Johnson (2004) were the first reporting a reduction o f the beta rebound after medial nerve 
stimulation when subjects concurrently observed a hand being brushed or pricked, but not when 
only movement was observed. Cheng, Yang et al. (2008) also observed reduced alpha rebound 
after medial nerve stimulation while people watched static pictures o f limbs in painful situations. 
Although these studies point to a modulation o f the somatosensory cortex, they do not show 
how somatosensory oscillations respond to the observation o f pain in the absence o f actual 
somatosensory stimulation. To investigate such a visual-to-somatosensory process, three EEG 
studies investigated effects on ongoing alpha oscillations after observing images o f painful 
situations versus control images, without a contingent transcranial or median nerve stimulation. 
Two o f these studies showed more sensorimotor alpha suppression in response to pain than in 
response to control images (Perry, et al., 2010; Yang, et al., 2009), while a third study showed 
reduced alpha suppression (Mu, et al., 2008). One reason for these contradictory outcomes 
might have been the fact that volume conduction makes it difficult to separate sensorimotor 
alpha (or mu-rhythm) from posterior alpha sources in EEG scalp recordings (Hari & Salmelin, 
1997). Since the strongest modulation o f alpha power typically involves alpha-blocking in 
response to visual stimulation (Pfurtscheller, Stancak, & Neuper, 1996), this activity might 
have confounded the interpretation of alpha activity from central sources that was found by Mu 
et al. (2008). Indeed, Perry, et al. (2010) only found increased suppression by pain observation on 
fronto-central but not on posterior sensors, while Yang et al (2009) only found increased central 
alpha suppression. Although these findings strongly suggest alpha suppression in response to the 
observation o f pain in others, they suffer from a lack o f spatial resolution needed to univocally 
establish a sensorimotor origin. These studies also suffered from underspecified or confounded 
time-windows o f interest. In Perry et al. (2010) alpha suppression was calculated over the full 
2 seconds post-stimulus, from stimulus onset to stimulus offset, while in Yang et al. (2009) the 
first 1.3 seconds directly after stimulus onset were used. In both cases stimulus-onset evoked 
responses were therefore included, making it ambiguous to what degree their observations can 
be interpreted exclusively as a modulation o f ongoing alpha activity and to what degree evoked 
responses contributed (Lopes da Silva, 1991; Mazaheri & Jensen, 2010; Pfurtscheller & Lopes 
da Silva, 1999; Steriade, et al., 1990). Mu et al. (2008) did perform an analysis on separate 
time-windows and reported modulation o f the alpha suppression only between 200 and 400 
milliseconds after stimulus-onset. They also tried to minimize the effect o f phase-locked activity 
on the power estimate by subtracting average ERP in response to stimulus-onset. Since images 
were presented for only 200 milliseconds, the power estimation might have stdll been confounded
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by transients in response to stimulus offset. Finally, the evaluation of every stimulus in Mu et al.,
(2008) might have resulted in motor preparation which previously has been shown to interact 
with sensorimotor oscillations in response to pain (Babiloni et al., 2008).
Concerns about the mixing o f central and posterior sources, evoked activity and motor- 
preparation aside, the differences in the direction o f alpha modulation might also point to the 
interesting possibility that different functional processes were involved. Historically, alpha activity 
has been interpreted as reflecting a non-functional ‘cortical idling’ state (Pfurtscheller e t al., 
1996). This view has recently been challenged, and a more functional interpretation o f alpha has 
been formulated that describes a mechanisms o f gating-through-inhibition (Jensen & Mazaheri, 
2010; Klimesch, 1999; Neuper & Pfurtscheller, 2001; Schack & Kumesch, 2002). According 
to this view, task-irrelevant regions are inhibited through an increase of alpha oscillations, routing 
information to task-relevant regions. For instance, it has been demonstrated that alpha activity 
over visual areas increases in motor tasks and vice versa (Pfurtscheller e t  al., 1996). A similar 
mechanism seems to function when attention is directed within the visual or somatosensory 
domain. For instance, when covert attention is directed to one hemifield (e.g., the left), alpha 
decreases in the contralateral (right) hemisphere but increases in the ipsilateral (left) hemisphere 
(Handel, Haasmeier, & Jensen, 2011; K elly , Gomez-Ramirez, & Foxe, 2009; Rihs, Michel, 
& Thut, 2007; Thut, e t  al., 2006; van Gerven & Jensen, 2009; Worden, e t  al., 2000). Alpha 
activity was also shown to decreasein the primary sensorimotor cortex contralateral to the engaged 
hand while it increased in the ipsilateral hemisphere during a somatosensory working memory 
task. In line with such a view, we propose that the findings o f (Perry e t al., 2010; Yang e t al., 
2009) show how observation o f pain in others induces a disinhibition o f the somatosensory 
cortex through alpha suppression. This would create the optimal cortical context in which 
somatosensory processes such as location and intensity coding of the observed pain (Keysers 
et al., 2010), can be performed. Such an account might also tentatively explain the increase in 
alpha reported by Mu et al. (2008). The short (200 milliseconds) presentation o f images, together 
with the task of evaluating these on their painful content, could have resulted in an increase of 
functional inhibition o f the somatosensory cortices for the purpose o f reducing interference 
during the evaluation o f the somatosensory (pain) representation. Similar processes have indeed 
been shown during the retention interval in a visual long term memory task (Meeuwissen e t al, 
in press) as well as during as somatosensory working memory task (Haegens, Handel, & Jensen, 
2011) where distraction in the visual or somatosensory modality was inhibited.
In the current experiment all of the previous concerns were dealt with for the purpose of 
unequivocally identifying sensorimotor alpha suppression in the observation of pain in others. 
Subjects viewed images of limbs in pain and no-pain situations in a passive task that required 
no evaluation or motor responses to the stimuli. To reduce concerns of mixing sources from
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different regions we recorded brain activity using magnetoencephalography (MEG) and applied 
a beamformer technique for source estimation. We did a time-frequency analysis over the whole 
post-stimulus interval, but restricted our statistical analysis on the non-evoked period (> 400ms). 
We hypothesized greater sensorimotor alpha suppression in response to painful images than in 
response to the observation of control images.
Methods
Participants
Twenty-one healthy participants (15 female, mean age 26.6 years, range: 20-49) enrolled after 
providing written informed consent and were paid in accordance with guidelines of the local 
ethics committee (CMO Committee on Research Involving Humans subjects, region Arnhem- 
Nijmegen, the Netherlands). Two participants were excluded from the analysis due to excessive 
eye or movement artifacts. One subject feil asleep during the experiment and was excluded as 
well. The experiment was in compliance with national legislation as well as the code of ethical 
principles (Declaration of Helsinki).
Stimuli
A series of 128 digital color pictures showing right hands and right feet in painful and non- 
painful situations were used. These stimuli were previously used and validated in behavioral 
and fMRI studies (Jackson et al., 2005; Jackson, Rainville, & Decety, 2006) and one 
magnetoencephalography (MEG) study (Cheng et al., 2008). All pictures depicted familiar 
events that can happen in everyday life involving mechanical, thermal, and pressure pain. The 
neutral pictures involved the same settings without any painful component. All pictures were 
edited to the same size (600 x 450 pixels).
Subjective empathy index
Within two weeks before the experiment commenced subjects filled in the Interpersonal Reactivity 
Index, a self-report questionnaire measuring different factors related to empathy (Davis, 1983).
Experiment
While seated in the MEG system, the stimuli were projected on a screen about 80 centimeters in 
front of the subject. These were all presented in random order for 1.5 seconds per trial, interleaved 
with grey fixations sereens of 1.5 seconds (Figure 1). The procedure was repeated over three 
blocks resulting in a total experimental time of ~45 minutes. Subjects were instructed to remain 
relaxed and not move their limbs, their compliance observed by the experimenter using infrared
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camera. To make sure subjects paid attention to the stimuli, ten percent of presentations showed 
a short twisted movement, created by shordy (~500 ms) presenting, within one stimulation, the 
same picture modified with a twirl filter (P h o t o sh o p , A d o b e  Sy st e m s  I n c .). Subjects were required 
to internally count the number of these occurrences and report them to the experimenter after 
each block. Target stimuli were discarded from further analysis. The experiment was programmed 
in Presentation (h t t p :/ / n b s/ n e u r o b s .c o m ).
pain 
fixation
fixation
Figure 1. The experimental paradigm. Subjects were presented with pictures depicting limbs painful and 
non-painful situation, interleaved with grey fixation sereens. 10% of the pictures showed a small rotation in 
the center of the picture (target), the total number of which they had to internally count and report back
after each session.
Data acquisition
Continuous MEG was recorded using a 275 sensor axial gradiometer system (CTF MEG TM 
Systems Inc., Port Coquitlam, Canada) placed in a magnetically shielded room. The ongoing 
MEG signals were low-pass filtered at 300 Hz, digitized at 1200 Hz and stored for off-line 
analysis. The subjects’ head position was contdnuously recorded relative to the gradiometer array 
using coils positioned at the subject’s nasion and at the left and right ear canals. High-resolution 
anatomical images (1 mm isometric voxel size) were acquired using a 1.5 T Siemens Magnetom 
Sonata system (Erlangen, Germany). The same earplugs, using vitamin E instead o f the coils, 
were used for coregistration with the MEG data.
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Data analysis
MEG data was analyzed using the Matlab-based Fieldtrip toolbox, developed at the Donders 
Institute for Brain, Cognition and Behavior (http://fieldtrip.fcdonders.nl/). Trials containing 
movement, muscle and superconducting quantum interference device (SQUID) jumps were 
discarded by visual inspection. Independent component analysis (ICA) was used to remove eye 
and heart artifacts. For the sensor-level analysis, planar gradients of the MEG field distribution 
were calculated using a nearest-neighbor method comparable with the method described 
by (Bastiaansen & Knosche, 2000) and also Applied by e.g. J okisch and J ensen (2007), 
Nieuwenhuis, Tahashima et al. (2008), Mazaheri et al. (2009), Haegens, Osipova et al.
(2010) and FLaegens, Handel et al. (2011)). The horizontal and vertical components of the 
estimated planar gradients approximate the signal measured by planar gradiometers while making 
the sensor-level data easier to interpret as the maximal activity is typically located above the source 
(Hamalainen, et al., 1993). For source reconstruction, however, we used the original data from 
the axial sensors.
Time-frequency and ERF analysis on the sensor level
For the rime-window surrounding the stimulus (-0.4 s to 1.5 s), time-frequency representations 
(TFRs) of power were calculated using a Hanning taper approach applied to short sliding time 
windows (Percival & Walden, 1993) using an adaptive time window of four cycles length (At= 
4/f). The data in each time window were multiplied with a Hanning taper. The power values were 
calculated as the sum of the horizontal and vertical component of the estimated planar gradiënt 
after subtracting the mean amplitude from the entire time interval. The planar gradiënt power 
estimates were subsequently averaged over trials for the pain and control condition. To investigate 
the event related changes in activity we calculated the change of power in response to stimulus 
presentation relative to the average power during the 200 ms before stimulus onset.
For the time-window surrounding the stimulus (-0.4 s to 1.5 s), event related fields (ERFs) were 
calculated. The data were then lowpass filtered at 40Hz using a butterworth filter (order of six), 
and averaged separately for every condition. Similarly as with the frequency analysis, averaging 
was done on the planar gradients after which they were summed.
Statistical analysis on the sensor level
To avoid ‘double dipping’ (Kriegeskorte, et al., 2009) we restricted our statistical comparison to 
those sensors where we have previously shown the central mu-rhythm to be maximally modulated 
in a somatosensory task (Haegens, Handel et. al, (2010): MLC24, MLC25, MLC31, MLC32, 
MLP35, MLC42, MLP23, MRC24, MRC25, MRC31, MRC32, MRP35, MRC42, MRP23, see
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highlighted sensors in Fig 3A); We compared the mean log transformed alpha (7-14 Hz) and 
beta (15 - 25Hz) band power over one second post stimulus period, starting at 400ms to exclude 
the contribution of evoked components. Although no differences in the beta band activity were 
expected, a clear beta suppression in response to both pain and non-painful stimuli prompted an 
ad-hoc testing for differences between conditions.
Source reconstruction
Source reconstruction was performed using a frequency-domain beamformer approach (Dynamic 
Imaging o f Coherent Sources) which uses adaptive spatial filters to localize power in the entire 
brain (Gross et al., 2001; Liljestrom, K ujala, J ensen, & Salmelin, 2005). The brain volume o f 
each individual subject was discretized to a grid with a 0.8 cm resolution. For every grid point a 
spatial filter was constructed from the cross-spectral density matrix and the lead field. The lead 
fields were calculated from a subject specific realistic single-shell model o f the brain (Nolte, 2003), 
based on the individual anatomical MRIs. We calculated the cross-spectral density matrix based 
upon both the post-stimulus (200 — 1400 ms) as well as pre-stimulus (1400 -  200 ms pre-stimulus) 
interval to obtain the most accurate estimation o f the alpha source. Furthermore, both conditions 
were combined for the purpose o f calculating the spatial filter, after which the power at each grid 
point was estimated for both conditions separately in every subject. Sources were estimated using 
a multitaper approach to accomplish accurate frequency smoothing for the alpha band (10 Hz 
+/- 2 Hz by using 3 Slepian tapers). Prior to averaging, the source estimates o f the individual 
subjects’ functional data were spatially normalized using SPM2 to the International Consortium 
for Brain Mapping template (Montreal Neurological Institute (MNI), Montreal, Quebec, 
Canada; http://www.bic.mni.mcgill.ca/brainweb) .
Results
Subjects were presented with static images depicting limbs in painful and non-painful situatdons 
from a first-person perspective. We investigated the role of sensorimotor rhythms in processing 
the painful content.
Widespread modulation of alpha and beta band activity following visual stimuli
First, we investigated the responses to combined painful and non-painful stimuli. As shown in 
Figure 2A, these resulted in marked reductions in occipital alpha (mean 49.9% of baseline, SEM 
5.3%), extending to central sensors power (mean 74% of baseline, SEM 4.3%). At central sensors 
separate alpha and beta components could readily be distinguished (Figure 2B and 2C). This 
demonstrates widespread modulation in the alpha and beta frequencies including both occipital 
and central regions.
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Figure 2. Oscillatory responses to visual stimuli. A The topographic representation of alpha (7-14 Hz) 
suppression in response to visual stimuli (0.5-1.35s). B Time-frequency representations of central sensors.
C Time-frequency representations of occipital sensors. Time-frequency window of interest (0.4-1.35s;
7-14Hz) oudined in black.
Greater sensorimotor alpha suppression in response to painful pictures
We then tested if  these oscillatory responses were different in response to painful compared 
to non-painful stimuli. As predicted, the strongest modulation was observed at central regions 
over the head (Figure 3A), showing consistency in topography with a previous investigation of 
attention-related alpha modulation using the same MEG system and comparable spectral analysis 
(Haegens et al., 2011). A t-test comparing the average (log transformed) power between pain 
and control pictures on these sensors yielded a significant difference (mean difference 2.19%, 
SEM = 0.63% ,p  = 0.019, one-sided) demonstrating that the painful stimuli resulted in stronger 
sensorimotor alpha suppression than pictures showing non-painful situations. Difference in 
beta power only showed a trend towards increased suppression (mean difference 1.41%, SEM = 
1.07% ,p  = 0.062, one-sided). Source analysis confirmed that the origin of the alpha difference 
was located along the central sulcus (Figure 3d).
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highüghted sensors in Fig 3A); We compared the mean log transformed alpha (7-14 Hz) and 
beta (15 - 25Hz) band power over one second post stimulus period, starting at 400ms to exclude 
the contribution of evoked components. Although no differences in the beta band activity were 
expected, a clear beta suppression in response to both pain and non-painful stimuli prompted an 
ad-hoc testing for differences between conditions.
Source reconstruction
Source reconstruction was performed using a frequency-domain beamformer approach (Dynamic 
Imaging o f Coherent Sources) which uses adaptive spatial filters to localize power in the entire 
brain (Gross et al., 2001; Liljestrom, K ujala, Jensen, & Salmelin, 2005). The brain volume of 
each individual subject was discretized to a grid with a 0.8 cm resolution. For every grid point a 
spatial filter was constructed from the cross-spectral density matrix and the lead field. The lead 
fields were calculated from a subject specific realistic single-shell model o f the brain (Nolte, 2003), 
based on the individual anatomical MRIs. We calculated the cross-spectral density matrix based 
upon both the post-stimulus (200 — 1400 ms) as well as pre-stimulus (1400 — 200 ms pre-stimulus) 
interval to obtain the most accurate estimation o f the alpha source. Furthermore, both conditions 
were combined for the purpose o f calculating the spatial filter, after which the power at each grid 
point was estimated for both conditions separately in every subject. Sources were estimated using 
a multitaper approach to accomplish accurate frequency smoothing for the alpha band (10 Hz 
+/- 2 Hz by using 3 Slepian tapers). Prior to averaging, the source estimates o f the individual 
subjects’ functional data were spatially normalized using SPM2 to the International Consortium 
for Brain Mapping template (Montreal Neurological Institute (MNI), Montreal, Quebec, 
Canada; http://www.bic.mni.mcgill.ca/brainweb).
Results
Subjects were presented with static images depicting limbs in painful and non-painful situations 
from a first-person perspective. We investigated the role of sensorimotor rhythms in processing 
the painful content.
Widespread modulation of alpha and beta band activity following visual stimuli
First, we investigated the responses to combined painful and non-painful stimuli. As shown in 
Figure 2A, these resulted in marked reductions in occipital alpha (mean 49.9% of baseline, SEM 
5.3%), extending to central sensors power (mean 74% of baseline, SEM 4.3%). At central sensors 
separate alpha and beta components could readily be distinguished (Figure 2B and 2C). This 
demonstrates widespread modulation in the alpha and beta frequencies including both occipital 
and central regions.
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Figure 2. Oscillatory responses to visual stimuli. A The topographic representation of alpha (7-14 Hz) 
suppression in response to visual stimuli (0.5-1,35s). B Time-frequency representations of central sensors.
C Time-frequency representations of occipital sensors. Time-frequency window of interest (0.4-1.35s;
7-14Hz) outlined in black.
Greater sensorimotor alpha suppression in response to painful pictures
We then tested if these oscillatory responses were different in response to painful compared 
to non-painful stimuli. As predicted, the strongest modulation was observed at central regions 
over the head (Figure 3A), showing consistency in topography with a previous investigation of 
attention-related alpha modulation using the same MEG system and comparable spectral analysis 
(Haegens et ai.., 2011). A t-test comparing the average (log transformed) power between pain 
and control pictures on these sensors yielded a significant difference (mean difference 2.19%, 
SEM = 0.63% ,p  = 0.019, one-sided) demonstrating that the painful stimuli resulted in stronger 
sensorimotor alpha suppression than pictures showing non-painful situations. Difference in 
beta power only showed a trend towards increased suppression (mean difference 1.41%, SEM = 
1.07%,/) = 0.062, one-sided). Source analysis confirmed that the origin of the alpha difference 
was located along the central sulcus (Figure 3d).
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Figure 3. Sensorimotor alpha suppression in response to pain. A The topographical representation of 
the difference in sensorimotor alpha power (7-14Hz) calculated by subtracting average alpha power (0.4- 
1.35s; log transformed) of the no-pain stimuli from the painful stimuli. Highüghted sensors are taken 
from Haegens et al. (2011). B Time-frequency representation of the pain minus no-pain condition of the 
highüghted sensors in panel A. Box depicts time-frequency window of interest (p = 0.019). C Evoked 
responses and Standard deviation for pain and no-pain averaged over highüghted sensors from panel A. D 
Source reconstractdons of alpha difference obtained using beamformer, showing sources along the central
sulcus.
No difference in the ERF between painful and control pictures
We also calculated the event related fields (ERFs) to investigate if  pain observation could be 
observed in neuronal activity time-locked to the stimulus. Early visual evoked components 
(<400ms) were clearly reflected in the ERFs, while during the interval in which we found 
sustained alpha suppression (>400ms) the ERF deflection returned towards baseline. A cluster- 
based randomization test based upon every timepoint found no difference between conditions 
for neither occipital nor central sensors (depicted in the boxes of Figure 2A), nor for the 
central sensors selected for our frequency analysis (Figure 3C). Our findings of increased alpha 
suppression therefore seem unrelated to differences in evoked responses.
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No correlations with subjective empathy reports
We also tested for correlations between the magnitude of the modulation of the neuronal 
response by the pain effect and subjective reports of empathetic distress in daily life. Individual 
scores on the Interpersonal Reactivity Index (M. H. Davis, 1983) did not correlate reliably with 
the magnitute of the alpha modulation (perspective taking: p  = 0.494, empathetic concern: p  = 
0.862; fantasy:p  = 0.433; personal distress:p  — 0.248; total: p  = 0.522), nor with the magnitute of 
the beta modulation (perspective taking: p  — 0.667, empathetic concern: p  = 0.910; fantasy: p  = 
0.829; personal distress: p  = 0.486; total:p  = 0.960).
Discussion
We used MEG to investigate neural oscillations in vicarious pain perception. We found wide-spread 
alpha- and beta-band depression in response to visual stimuli, predominantly at posterior sensors. 
In contradistinction to these widespread visual responses, observing pain depressed alpha power 
selectively more at central sensors. By applying source modelling we identified the sources of this 
difference along the central sulcus, implicating sensorimotor regions in the observation of pain. 
Strikingly, central and posterior ERFs did not show differences between conditions, suggesting a 
unique role for induced activity in the brain’s response to observing other people in pain. These 
results provide support for the involvement of sensorimotor oscillations in empathetic responses.
Alpha oscillations might be providing a graded level o f excitability and inhibition in task relevant 
and irrelevant regions, streamlining information flow dependent on moment-by-moment task 
demands (Jensen & Mazaheri, 2010; K limesch, 1999; Neuper & Pfurtscheller, 2001; Schack 
& K limesch, 2002). Increased alpha suppression in the observation o f pain is also in accordance 
with previous reports o f oscillatory involvement in the subjective perception of (first-person) pain 
intensity (Babiloni et al., 2006) and in the anticipation o f pain (Babiloni et al., 2008) and fits 
well within the general understanding that sensorimotor alpha oscillations provide a dynamically 
modulated cortical context for somatosensory processing (Haegens et al., 2011; Haegens et al., 
2010; Lopes da Silva, 1991; Pfurtscheller & Lopes da Silva, 1999). What sensorimotor alpha 
suppression might represent in terms o f underlying empathetic mechanisms remains under debate, 
however. While activation o f sensorimotor regions in fMRI studies can be interpreted in terms of 
perception-action coupling (Keysers et al., 2010), or o f unspecific co-activation (Lamm et al.,
2011), our results taken together with the emerging understanding o f the functional relevance of 
alpha oscillations (Jensen & Mazaheri, 2010; K limesch, 1999; Lopes da Silva, 1991), however 
strongly suggest a disinhibition o f the sensorimotor cortices in response to the observation of 
pain in others. It is in no way suggested, however, that sensorimotor alpha suppression is by itself 
sufficiënt for empathy. As has been argued convincingly at length elsewhere (de Vignemont &
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Singer, 2006; K eysers et al., 2010; Lamm et al., 2011), empathy is a multidimensional response 
to a variety of situations, real and imagined. Not one neutal mechanism will be able to explain its 
full expression. Noteworthy are the results by Betti and collegeaus (2009) who found increased 
gamma band coherence between primary sensory and motor regions when subjects watched 
painful movies. Their results further emphasize the importance of understanding empathy 
through dynamic oscillatory interactions of neuronal assemblies distributed within and across 
different specialized brain regions. Neither is it claimed here that sensorimotor alpha oscillations 
are specifically involved in social processes. We understand alpha oscillations more generally as a 
(sensory) mechanism for gating-through-inhibition, which, in this particular case, is involved in 
the task of disinhibiting sensory cortices in response to the observation of pain in others.
Although we were able to localize the source of the empathetic alpha modulation along the 
central sulcus, we were not able to distinguish between primary somatosensory from primary 
motor regions. This might have been a problem of lack of signal strength, compared to those 
studies that have been able to localized alpha modulation to postcentral sulcus in response to 
actual tactile stimulation. For instance, in Caetano and colleagues (2007) observation of movement 
resulted in only 42% of the beta suppression that was found in response to actual movement. As 
we localized the difference between the pain and no-pain condition, a difference of only a couple 
of percent, this problem might have been exacerbated even further.
The fact that this study is limited to the observation of limbs might limit a generalization to the 
observation of other body parts that afford less action related responses. In fact, as mentioned 
before, besides the fact that sensorimotor alpha is clearly implicated in somatosensory attention 
and perception, it has also been a hallmark of action-perception. In our study the amount of 
action suggested in the images was, however, kept similar between conditions. For instance, where 
in the control condition one situation depicts the sawing through of a wooden log, the painful 
counterpart differed only by the fact that the second hand was in a painful position underneath 
the saw. Any difference between the observation of painful and control images therefore cannot 
be explained by a difference in action-perception between these conditions. This fact, together 
with the fact that alpha oscillations are commonly found to have a postcentral source (Cheyne 
et al., 2003; Jurkiewicz, Gaetz, Bostan, & Cheyne, 2006; Salmeun & Hari, 1994) makes an 
interpretation of our findings in terms of motor processes less likely.
Although subjects were instructed to remain relaxed and not move their limbs, and no responses 
were required, this cannot fully rule out ‘covert movement’ or muscle tension in response to the 
painful images. Although some (e.g. Yang et al., (2009) but not Perry et al., (2010)) record 
electromyography (EMG), a null-finding comparing average EMG across conditions will not be 
able to fully rule out differences below the sensitivity of the measurement, and any selection of
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muscles would have its limitations. More importantly, we did not find significant differences in 
the beta (~20Hz) band where effects of movement would be most pronounced (Cheyne et al., 
2003; Hajri & Salmeun, 1997; Jurkiewicz et al., 2006; Parkes, Bastiaansen, & Norris, 2006; 
Salmelin, Hamalainen, K ajola, & Hari, 1995).
We did not find any correlation with self-report questionnaires and contribute to the existing 
confusion in the literature. In Fan and Han (2008), self-reported unpleasantness of the observed 
pain stimuli correlated with early evoked potentials to painful observation, but did so only in 
an evaluation task and not in the counting task, which would be more similar to our passive 
paradigm. Mu and colleagues (2008) reported negative correlations for both perceived pain and 
self-unpleasantness, also in a similar evaluation task. Conversely, Cheng and colleagues (2008) 
found only positive correlations of perspective taking with sensory-evoked alpha rebound, and no 
correlation with empathy quotiënt questionnaire (EQ: Baron-Cohen and Wheelwright (2004), 
the emotional contagion scale , or ECS: Doherty (1997)) or any subscales of the interpersonal 
reaction index (IRI: Davis (1983). Finally, Yang and colleagues (2009) found that the effect of 
pain on the alpha rebound correlated with the personal distress subscale of the IRI, but only in 
females. Taken together, it seems that the most consistent findings have been found correlating the 
subjective quality of individual stimuli trials with oscillatory activity, while correlating individual 
traits have been less conclusive.
Concluding, observing limbs in pain supressed ongoing alpha oscillations more than observing 
control images. This effect was localized along the central sulcus, implicating somatosensory alpha 
oscillations in the observation of pain in others. These findings support an interpretation in terms 
of gating-through-inhibition where observation of painful images disinhibits the somatosensory 
cortex through alpha suppression.
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3
Mindfulness reduces habitual responding based on 
implicit knowledge6,7
Abstract
Participants were unknowingly exposed to complex regularities in a working memory task. 
The existence of implicit knowledge was subsequendy inferred from a preference for stimuli 
with similar grammaócal regularities. Several affective traits have been shown to influence AGL 
performance positively, many of which are related to a tendency for automatic responding. We 
therefore tested whether the mindfulness trait predicted a reduction of grammatically congruent 
preferences, and used emotional primes to explore the influence of affect. Mindfulness was 
shown to correlate negatively with grammatically congruent responses. Negative primes were 
shown to result in faster and more negative evaluations. This effect was negatively correlated with 
the ability to accurately describe the grammar, suggesting that affective heuristics are used in the 
absence of explicit knowledge. We conclude that grammatically congruent preference ratings 
rely on habitual responses, and that our findings provide empirical evidence for the non-reactive 
disposition of the mindfulness trait.
6 This chapter was made possible by the BIAL Funda9ao, grant number 122/08. The authors also gratefully acknowledge 
the support o f the BrainGain Smart Mix Programme o f the Netherlands Ministry o f Economic Affairs and the Netherlands Ministry 
o f Education, Culture and Science the Netherlands Inltiative Brain and Cognition, a part o f the Organization for Scientific Research 
(NWO) under grant number SSM0611, and the Max Planck Institute for Psycholinguistics, Donders Institute for Brain, Cognition and 
Behaviour, Funda^ao para a Ciência e Tecnologia (PTDC/PSI-PCO/110734/2009; IBB/CBME, LA, FEDER/POCI 2010; PEst- 
OE/EQB/LA0023/2011), and Vetenskapsradet.
7 This chapter is based on: Whitmarsh S, Udden J, Barendregt HP, Petersson, KMP (2013) Mindfulness reduces habitual 
responding based on implicit knowledge: Evidence from Artificial Grammar Learning, Consciousness and Cognition, 14;22(3):833-845
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Inttoduction
Implicit learning
Implicit learning is the ability to acquire knowledge of complex regularities without conscious 
intent or awareness (Seger, 1994). Skill learning, habit learning and procedural learning are related 
forms of implicit learning. Implicidy acquired knowledge is typically not accessible or represented 
explicidy (e.g., in a language-based manner) in the form of facts (knowing that). Nevertheless, 
implicit knowledge (knowing how), underlies much of our behavioral repertoire - from riding a 
bike to blind typing - and is important in understanding the world and people around us, from 
musical appreciation to navigating the complexities of language (Stadler & Frensch, 1998). In 
the lab, implicit knowledge is often inferred from faster processing of structured stimuli, that are 
comparable (on some stimulus dimension) to those individuals previously have been exposed to 
(in e.g. real life or in the lab). In addition, evidence for implicitly acquired knowledge is commonly 
observed through the development of a preference or ‘gut-feeling’ for similarly structured stimuli, 
typically in the absence of verbal access to what is known.
Artificial Grammar Learning
Artifïcial grammar learning (AGL) is probably the most studied paradigm for investigating 
implicit learning. The paradigm distinguishes an acquisition phase and test phase (Cleeremans, 
Destrebecqz, & Boyer, 1998; Forkstam & Petersson, 2005b). In the acquisition phase, 
participants are exposed to a set of symbol sequences generated from a formal grammar (i.e., 
a complex rule system), often in the form of a short term memory task. In the subsequent test 
phase subjects are often first debriefed about the existence of an underlying complex set of rules 
and instructed to classify a novel set of sequences according to grammaticality, based on guessing 
or ‘gut feeling’. It is a robust and well-replicated finding that subjects perform significantly 
above chance on this type of task with little, if  any, explicit knowledge about their classification 
capacity (Cleeremans et al., 1998; Forkstam, Elwer, Ingvar, & Petersson, 2008; Forkstam & 
Petersson, 2005b). In fact, when subjects are not informed about the existence of a grammar, 
similar classification performance can be observed using forced-choice preference ratings (like/ 
dislike) (Folia et al., 2008; Forkstam, Elwer, et al., 2008). There is good evidence that the 
frontal cortex and the basal ganglia (fronto-striatal circuits) are involved in implicit learning in 
humans. This has been characterized in patiënt (lesion) studies (Forkstam & Petersson, 2005b; 
Seger, 1994), functional neuroimaging studies (Forkstam, et al., 2006; Lieberman, et al., 2004; 
Rose, et al., 2002) and brain stimulation studies (de Vries et al., 2010). Furthermore, in healthy 
volunteers transcranial magnetic stimulation of Broca’s area has causal effects on classification 
after implicit learning of an artificial grammar (Udden et ai.., 2008). Imaging studies of AGL
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repeatedly fïnd activations in the basal ganglia, in particular the striatum (Forkstam e t al., 2006; 
Petersson, Folla, & Hagoort, 2010). Taken together these findings suggest a common neural 
substrate of different forms of implicit learning (for a review see: Forkstam & Petersson (2005a) 
and Yin & Knowlton, (2006)).
The role and mechanisms of affect on preference for grammaticality
While implicit knowledge acquisition is a robust and well established phenomenon, a conclusive 
account of how such knowledge is expressed in implicit preference or explicit endorsement 
rates does not yet exist. Gordon and Holyoak (1983) proposed a role for the mere-exposure 
effect (Zajonc, 1968). In the mere-exposure effect, repeated (unreinforced) exposure results in 
positive affect towards those stimuli (for an overview see Bornstein (1989)). In the structural 
mere-exposure effect grammatical sequences are processed more easily during classification 
due to the previous grammatical stimuli. Similarly to the traditional mere-exposure effect, this 
increased fluency is then interpreted as a preference. Interestingly, both Newell & Bright (2001) 
and Zizak & Reber (2004) showed that when classification sequences are presented with different 
or degraded surface features, performance based on preference is abolished while explicit ratings 
of grammaticality remain unimpaired. This suggests that familiarity with lower level features is 
required before structural mere-exposure effects can occur on more complex (grammatical) levels 
of stimulus processing. Scott and Dienes (2010) showed that while perceptual fluency influences 
preference judgments, under controlled conditions this provides participants only with a ‘dumb’ 
heuristic. In fact, preference judgments were shown to be based on perceptual fluency when 
participants had only very limited time to process the sequences and more accurate evaluations 
(based on familiarity) could not be made. Although these studies show that fluency can influence 
preference ratings, they do not explain in what way preference ratings are related to the implicitly 
acquired grammar. The question remains whether preference for grammatical sequences is the 
result of a positive (affective) association with the representation of the grammar, or whether 
preference instead should be understood as a response outcome of non-affective cognitive 
processes.
Feelings versus affect
It is important at this point to consider ‘affect’ separately from ‘feeling’. Cognitive appraisals 
and motivational processes are intimately involved in the former, resulting in action tendencies 
that do not necessarily involve subjective, feit experiences (cf., Frijda (1986), Damasio (2003) 
and Berridge & W inkielman (2003)). Preference judgments made in AGL classification might 
therefore not express actual preferences (i.e., conscious feeling states towards (non-)grammatical 
stimuli) but rather reflect motivational processes that result in automatically endorsing certain 
stimuli rather than others. In this study, we directly tested whether an affective component is
CHAPTER 3. Mindfulness reduces habitual responding based on implicit knowledge
involved in AGL classification by using masked affective primes. Furthermore, we investigated 
the relationship between individual differences in AGL performance and mindfulness, describing 
an individual’s disposition to disengage from automatic reactions and attend to internal and 
external stimuli in a non-judgmental and non-reactive way.
Mindfulness state and meditation
Mindfulness had been formally defined as “paying attention in a particular way: on purpose, in 
the present moment, and non-judgmentally” (J. Kabat-Zinn, 1994), ‘the state o f being attentive 
to and aware o f what is taking place in the present’, (Brown & Ryan (2003) and in similar vein 
Bishop et al. (2004)). It prevents one from “...falling prey to automatic judgments or reactivity” 
(Segal, W illiams, & Teasdale, 2002). Often contrasted to the conceptual mode o f processing, 
a mindful mode o f processing involves a receptive state o f mind wherein attention is kept to 
bare registering o f the facts observed. This permits the individual to ‘be present’ in reality as it is, 
rather than to automatically react to or habitually process it through conceptual filters (e.g Brown 
& Ryan (2003) and Bishop et al. (2004)). This is not an uncontroversial claim to make since 
concepts, labels and judgments are often imposed automatically on all stimuli encountered (e.g. 
Bargh & Crartrand (1999)). However, evidence is accumulating that practicing mindfulness 
suspends automatic processes such as interference in the Stroop task (Moore & Maunowski,
2009), reduces cognitive rigidity in the Einstellung water jar task (Greenberg, Reiner, & Meiran,
2012) and improves cognitive (Heeren, Van Broeck, & Philippot, 2009) and executive flexibility 
(Hodgins & A dair, 2010). The claim that these effects are the result o f attentional training is 
supported by findings showing that mindfulness training improves attention-orienting and 
alerting processes (Jha, K rompinger, & Baime, (2007), Jha et al., (2010) van den Hurk, et al.
(2010)), decreases the attentional blink effect ( S l a g t e r  e t  a l . ,  2007) and increases attentional 
stability ( L u t z  e t  a l . ,  2009).
Mindfulness in clinical interventions
Mindfulness techniques have been successfully implemented within clinical interventions, e.g. in 
patients with recurrent major depression (see C h ie s a  &  S e r r e t t i  (2011) and P i e t  &  H o u g a a r d
(2011) for recent reviews), in those suffering from residual negative ruminations ( K i n g s t o n  e t  a l .  
(2007) and R a m e l  e t  a l .  (2004)), generaüzed anxiety ( R o e m e r  &  O r s i l l o ,  2002) and attentional 
deficits in ADHD ( Z y lo w s k a  e t  a l . ,  2008). Although it is argued that its clinical efficaciousness 
relies partly on the development of a non-judgmental and non-reactive disposition (e.g. B r o w n  
e t  a l .  (2007) and T e a s d a le  e t  a l .  (2002)), empirical work investigating this connection remains 
scant. To the best of our knowledge, only Raes et al. (2009) showed that the mindfulness trait 
correlated negatively with cognitive reactivity to sad mood, and importantly, that this cognitive 
reactivity was reduced after mindfulness training.
CHAPTER 3. Mindfulness reduces kabitual responding based on implicit knowledge
The mindfulness trait and how to measure it
There is a growing consensus that the mindfulness disposition is an inherent capacity (Brown 
& Ryan, 2003; K abat-Zinn, 2003; K uhlman, 2002), which can be measured in the general 
non-meditating population using self-report questionnaires (see Baer et al. (2006) & (2011), 
Brown and Ryan (2004), but also see G rossman and V an D am (2011) for a critical perspective) 
with good to excellent test-retest reliability (Veehof, et ai.. 2011). Self-report questionnaires 
range in complexity from one scale questionnaires (Brown & Ryan, 2003) to the Five Factor 
Mindfulness Questionnaire (FFMQ; Baer et al. (2006), for an overview see Baer (2011)). The 
FFMQ is the result of a factor analysis of five previously developed questionnaires and has good 
internal consistency as well as convergent and discriminant relationships with other constructs. 
It correlates positively with meditation experience and with Standard personality traits such as 
openness to experience, while correlating negatively with neuroticism and absent-mindedness 
as well as clinically relevant traits such as difficulties in emotional regulation, alexithymia and 
dissociation (Baer et al. (2006, 2008)).
Individual difference in affective reactions, general cognition and implicit learning
Evidence for the role o f affective states and traits in implicit learning performance or mere- 
exposure effects, comes from studies investigating individual differences. The mere-exposure 
effect has been shown to be under a positive influence o f negative affective state (Harmon-Jones 
& Allen, 2001) as well as personality traits such as proneness for boredom (Bornstein, K ale, & 
Cornell, 1990) and intolerance o f  ambiguity (Crandall, 1968). Importantly, AG L performance 
seems to be independent o f cognitive abilities such as general intelligence and working memory 
capacity (Gebauer & Mackintosh, 2007; Reber, W alkenfeld, & Hernstadt, 1991). Kaufman and 
colleagues (2010), however, found a positive correlation between implicit learning performance on 
the serial response time task (SRT) and processing speed, verbal reasoning and language abilities. 
Furthermore, they found a positive relationship with a Big Five personality style characterized 
by Openness. Notably, Norman and colleagues (Norman, Price, & D uff, 2006 & 2007) did not 
find such a relationship in their deterministic SRT task. Compelling evidence for the effect of 
an affective and motivational state o f the individual comes from Proulx & Heine (2009), who 
showed an increased ability to identify grammatical sequences in an AG L task when participants 
had just read an anxiety-inducing short-story by Kafka or when they had argued against their self- 
unity. The authors interpreted their findings in terms o f an increased desire to find and construct 
patterns after a meaning-threat. Finally, an influence o f affective traits has also been found for the 
Iowa Gambling task, where neuroticism (Carter & Pasqualini, 2004) and trait anxiety (Schmtit, 
Brinkley, & Newman, 1999) correlated positively with performance.
Concluding, previous work has shown that, aside from general linguistic abilities, affective
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states and traits interact with implicit learning. In terms of clinical as well as non-clinical traits, 
affective processes and personality traits seem involved in implicit learning, including negative 
mood (Harmon-Jones &  A llen, 2001), anxiety (Schmitt et al ., 1999), neuroticism (Carter &  
Pasqualini, 2004) and meaning threats (Proulx &  H eine, 2009). Importantly these display a 
remarkable overlap with states and traits negatively associated with mindfulness (described in 
paragraph 3.1.5 to 3.1.7). In other words, implicit learning seems to benefit from a disposition to 
respond habitually and reactively, traits strikingly opposite to the mindful disposition.
Manipulation of affective states: Affective primes
The causal effect of feelings on implicit learning can only be investigated by controlled experiments 
in which affect is systematically manipulated. Besides Proulx and Heine (2009) we know of 
no such studies. It is well established that masked semantic primes reliably induce congruent 
semantic facilitation on subsequent target stimuli (for a review see V an den B ussche et al . (2009) 
and K ouider &  D ehaene (2007)). Furthermore, masked emotional faces have been shown to 
result in congruent affective judgments on subsequent ideographs (R otteveel et al., 2001). In 
the current study were therefore used masked affective primes to explore whether primed affect 
influences retrieval of implicit knowledge.
Experiment
Participants performed a five day working memory task. Unbeknownst to them, sequences were 
generated according to complex rules. On three occasions novel items were classified according 
to preference (like/dislike): at baseline, after working memory sessions, and on the last day of the 
experiment. After the last preference task participants were debtiefed about the existence of a 
complex rule system behind the working memory stimuli. They were then instructed to perform 
grammaticality judgments (grammatical/non-grammatical) on a new stimulus set. Also unknown 
to the participants, all target stimuli (classification sequences) were preceded by subliminally 
presented (backward and forward masked) neutral, positive (happy) or negative (disgust) faces. 
To estimate the degree of explicit knowledge about the grammar after the completion of the 
experiment, participants answered a structured multiple-choice questionnaire of the grammar’s 
bigram state transitions. Finally, participants filled in the FFMQ.
Hypothesis
We hypothesized that individual endorsement rates (the preference for grammatical sequences over 
non-grammatical sequences, and grammaticality classification performance) would be negatively 
correlated with FFMQ scores. To control for a confounding relationship between mindfulness 
and verbal or general cognitive abilities, we tested for a correlation of mindfulness with working
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memory performance and the ability of participants to make grammatica! rules explicit after 
completion of the experiment. Explicit knowledge was expected to correlate positively with 
grammatica! classification performance. Lasdy, we predicted that sequences preceded by positive 
primes would result in more positive judgments (of preference and grammaticality), while 
sequences preceded by negative primes were expected to result in more negative judgments.
Methods
Participants
Eighteen university students volunteered to participate in the study (13 females, 5 males, mean age 
= 22.2, SD = 6.7 years) for course credits. They were all pre-screened for relevant medical history, 
medication use, drug abuse, head trauma, neurological or psychiatric illness, and family history 
of neurological or psychiatric illness. All subjects had normal or corrected-to-normal vision. All 
participants gave written informed consent according to the Declaration of Helsinki.
Stimulus material
We generated 569 grammatical (G) sequences from the Reber grammar (see Figure 1) with a 
sequence length of 5 to 12 symbols (M , S, V, R and X). A robust finding in the AGL literature 
is that subjects are highly sensitive to chunks of two or three adjacent letters (bi- and trigrams). 
Although early in acquisition a sensitivity to these chunks indicates an initial shallow processing 
of the grammar, at the end of acquisition the grammatical status of the complete sequence has 
become a better predictor of classification (Forkstam, et a l . 2008). In this study we controlled 
for differences in the associative chunk strength (ACS), operationalized as the average chunk 
strength across all possible subsequences of two or three letters within the acquisition sequences. 
We calculated the complete associative chunk strength for each sequence in relation to the 
complete set of 569 sequences (c.f. K nowlton &  S quire (1996), M eulemans &  V an der L inden 
(1997) and U dden et al . (2008)). In an iterative procedure 100 sequences were randomly selected 
and tested with respect to its ACS content in order to generate the acquisition set which was 
representative in terms of ACS in comparison to the complete sequence set. The classification 
sets were subsequendy derived from the remaining 469 grammatical sequences and for each 
of these a non-grammatical sequence was derived by a switch of letters in two non-terminal 
positions. Finally, 6 sets of 64 sequences were randomly selected from the 469 grammatical and 
their matched 469 non-grammatical sequences in an iterative procedure, in order to generate 
classification sets consisting of 50% grammatical and non-grammatical sequences, as well as 50% 
high and low ACS sequences relative to ACS information in the acquisition set and independent 
of grammaticality status. Working memory stimuli were presented in Arial (30 points font size) 
on a screen resolution of 1280x1024, 75 cm in front of the subject. Classification stimuli were
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presented in an identical setup. For all classification sets, grammatical and non-grammatical 
sequences did not differ in terms of ACS.
Figure 1. Implicit grammar underlying acquisition and classification sequences. A grammatical sequence is 
generated by concatenating letters of valid transitions (arrows), going from the start node to the end node.
Primes
Frontal-facing neutral, happy and disgusted faces from the Averaged Karolinska Directed 
Fmotional Faces set (Lundqvist, F lykt &  O hman, 1998; O osterhof &  T odorov, 2008) were 
used, consisting of (8 bit, 562x762 px) grayscale averages of 70 individuals (35 males and 35 
females) showing emotional expressions. The forward mask was constructed by superimposing 
rotated pieces of the neutral, positive and negative primes. The resulting mask scrambled the 
contours of the face as well as details of the emotional expression, while keeping gradients of the 
original images. The backward mask was a horizontally flipped version (mirrored over the vertical 
axis) of the forward mask. Masks were presented for 50 ms (three frames at 60 Hz), sandwiching 
the prime that was presented for 33 ms (two frames). Primes and masks were presented in the 
middle of the screen, spanning 20.5 by 24.5 cm, or 15.7 by 18.7 degrees of visual angle.
Software
The experiment was programmed in Presentation (Neurobehavioural Systems, neurobs.com). All 
analyses were conducted in Matlab (mathworks.com) and PASW Statistics 18 (SPSS inc., SPSS. 
com).
Questionnaires
To provide our participants with a continuous focus and to maintain the cover of the working 
memory (WM) task, each WM-session was concluded with a short questionnaire in which they
50
CHAPTER 3. Mindfulness reduces habitual responding based on implicit knowledge
had to report all strategies that they used to memorize WM sequences.
In a post-experimental pen-and-paper questionnaire, participants were first asked if  they noticed 
anything particular about the classification sequences and if  they used any strategies to classify 
them. They were then probed about knowledge of the grammar through multiple choice questions 
about all grammar bigram transitions. This created a structured way for participants to explicate 
knowledge about bigrams without being provided with any details of the rules. The following 
thirteen questions were asked: “What character(s) could the sequences start with?” (five response 
options, one for every character); “With what character(s) could the sequences end?” (idem). 
“What characters(s) could repeat themselves?” (idem). “What character(s) could follow character 
X?” (one question for each character with four response options per question, excluding X). 
“What character(s) could not follow X?” (idem). The total score for every subject was calculated 
by adding one point for every hit and subtracting one point for every miss or false alarm. The 
score was then divided by the number of questions, resulting values that could range from -2.2 
(worst performance) to 2.2. This score wiU be referred to as the Explicit Knowledge score, and 
EXPLICIT in the analysis. Mindfulness was measured using the Dutch version (de B ruin et al., 
2012) of the 39 item Five Factor Mindfulness Questionnaire (FFMQ, B aer et al . (2006)).
Procedure
The complete experiment spanned five days with one acquisition session each day. Before the 
first and after the second and fifth acquisition session a preference session was administered. 
After the last preference session participants were debriefed about the existence of underlying 
complex rules in the acquisition sequences (no details were given) and instructed to classify novel 
sequences in terms of grammaticality (yes/no) in a setup identical as the one used for the implicit 
classification sessions.
Working memory task
The acquisition task (~25 min) was presented as a short-term memory recall task. Every session 
twenty random items were drawn from the acquisition set, which was presented five times (a total 
of 100 presentations). During the acquisition task, the grammatical sequences were presented on 
the computer screen for four seconds. After the sequences disappeared, subjects had to repeat 
the sequence from memory by typing on a keyboard in a self-paced fashion. They were allowed to 
correct themselves using the backspace key. No performance feedback was provided.
Preference task
In the implicit classification task (—25 min) subjects were instructed to rate each sequence if they
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liked it or not, based on their immediate impression or “gut feeling”. They were told that this 
task might appear odd in the beginning but that they might develop a preference and could rely 
on guessing until then. The classification sequence was presented centrally on the screen for four 
seconds, followed by a response screen to which they could respond with left or right button 
press on a custom made response box. Inter-trial-interval was six seconds during which a fixation 
cross was presented. Subjects were allowed as much time as they needed but were instructed 
to respond quickly and without much deliberation (i.e., using their ‘gut feeling’ or immediate 
impression). A self-paced break was included after every ten trials. The session was split halfway 
into two blocks between which the valence of the response-buttons was switched. The initial 
valence for the buttons was determined at random at every session and clearly displayed during 
every response screen and before each block.
Grammatical classification task
After the third and final preference session subjects were debriefed about the existence of a 
complex system of rules generating the acquisition sequences in the working-memory task. They 
were told that during the next classification session they would be presented with new sequences 
of which only half were constructed according to those rules, and the other half violated the 
rules in an unspecified way. They were then instructed to decide wh ether the (novel) sequences 
were grammatical or not, based on their immediate intuitive impression or whatever strategy 
they have been using in the previous sessions (i.e., familiarity). Subjects were allowed as much 
time as they needed but were instructed to respond quickly and without much deliberation. The 
implementation of the task was identical to that of the preference session.
Priming
Unbeknownst to the participants, every letter sequence in both classification tasks was preceded 
by a forward and backwards masked emotional face. The prime valence (neutral, positive or 
neutral) was determined at random for each presentation.
Analysis
Workingmemory (WM) performance over sessions was analyzed with repeated-measures ANOVA. 
WM performance (LEVENSHTEIN) was indexed by mean Levenshtein distance between target 
sequence and remembered sequence. Levenshtein distance is the minimum number of edits 
(insertion, deletion, or substitution of a single character) needed to transform one sequence into the 
other. Low Levenshtein distancesthereforerepresentgoodWMperformance, and highLevenshtein 
distance poor WM performance. For the preference session, responses (PREFERENCE) were 
modeled using a linear model with grammaticality status (GRAMMATICALITY) as independent
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factor, subject (SUBJECT) as random factor and, if applicable, session (SESSION) as fixed 
factor. Responses during the explicit classification session (CLASSIFICATION) were modeled 
similarly. For the sake of simplicity, effects of GRAMMATICALITY on PREFERENCE 
(GRAMMATICALITY x PREFERENCE) or CLASSIFICATION (GRAMMATICALITY x 
CLASSIFICATION) will be reported as endorsement rates. Endorsement rates will therefore 
represent correct judgments of grammaticaüty status, as well as preference for grammatical 
and disliking of non-grammatical sequences. In figures endorsement rates will be depicted 
in percentages of total number of responses in the relevant condition. Effects of positive 
versus neutral primes (POS), and negative versus neutral primes (NEG), on PREFERENCE, 
CLASSIFICATION and response time (RT), were analyzed using a linear model with SUBJECT 
as a random effect variable and GRAMMATICALITY and POS or NEG as a fixed factor. When 
applicable, LEVENSHTEIN, post-experiment explicit knowledge (EXPLICIT) and mindfulness 
(FFMQ-total or subscales) were entered as covariates in a full factorial mixed model. Correlations 
between covariates (FFMQ, LEVENSFITEIN and EXPLICIT) were calculated using Pearson’s r.
Results
Acquisition task
Working memory performance improved over sessions (F(4,48) = 53.3, p < .001) and over 
repetitions (F(4,48) = 27.9, p < .001). Within-subject contrasts revealed that participants only 
improved in the first three sessions, showing no significant improvement between session 4 and
5 (session 1 vs. later: F (l) = 135.7 p < .001; session 2 vs. later: F (l) = 23.4, p = .001; session 3 vs. 
later: F(l) = 10.5, p = .007; session 4 vs. later: F (l) = .206, p = .658).
Preference task
Participants acquired a preference for grammatical sequences above non-grammatical sequences 
(F(l) = 128, p < .001), which increased with SESSION (see Figure 2) as shown by the significant 
interaction of GRAMMATICALITY with SESSION (F(2) = 53.1, p < .001). Preference was 
not congruent with grammatical status in the first session (F(l) = 1.42, p = 0.234), but strongly 
so on the second (F(l) = 13.6, p < .001) and third session (F(l) = 41.3, p < .001). In the final 
implicit classification session (session 3), participants preferred grammatical sequences an average 
of 63.2% (SD = 18.6%) over 36.4% (SD = 18.0%) for non-grammatical sequences.
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Figure 2. Development of endorsement rates for the preference task. Endorsement rates for grammatical 
(G) and nongrammatical (NG) sequences for each day. At baseline (Day 1) no preference for grammaticality 
was shown. The sensitivity to the grammar was improved over Days 3 and 5. ***p <.001.
Grammatical classification task
Participants were able to distinguish grammatical from non-grammatical sequences in the 
explicit session (F(l,2316) = 668, p < .001), responding affirmative to 77.4% (SD = 14.7%) of 
grammatical sequences, over only 29.9% (SD = 15.6%) when sequences violated the grammar. 
Grammaticality judgments also took longer than preference judgments (preference: M = 741 ms, 
SD -  16.7 ms; grammaticality: M = 906 ms, SD = 16.7; F(l) = 5.82, p = .028).
Effect of working memory performance on endorsement rates
In the preference task, no significant effect of working memory performance (LEVENSHTEIN) 
on PREFERENCE (F(16) = .069, p = .796) or endorsement (GRAMMATICALITY x 
LEVENSHTEIN; F(2284) = .874, p = .350) was found (see Figure 3C). In the grammatical 
classification task, LEVENSHTEIN had no effect on PREFERENCE (F(16) = .922, p = .315). 
LEVENSHTEIN did predict endorsement rate (GRAMMATICALITY x LEVENSHTEIN: 
F(2298) = 66.4, p < .001, see Figure 4C).
Correlations between working memory performance, explicit knowledge and mindfulness
Explicit Knowledge correlated significandy with LEVENSHTEIN on the first WM session 
(EXPLICIT; r = -.537, p = .022), and on later sessions (session 2: r = -.611, p = .007; session 3: 
r = -.580, p = .012; session 4: r = -.534, p = .041; session 5: r = -.642, p = .007). As expected, 
FFMQ did not correlate with LEVENSHTEIN on the first WM session (r = .320, p = .196), 
showing only marginal trends towards significance on the last two sessions (uncorrected: session
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2: r = .274, p = .271; session 3: r = .024, p = .925; session 4: r = .486, p = .066; session 5: r = 
.438, p = .090). Additional analysis showed that LEVENSHTEIN, when averaged over sessions, 
did not correlate with FFMQ (r = 0.210, p = 0.402). Only a marginal trend emerged when the 
correlation was based on a concatenation (not average) of LEVENSHTEIN of all five sessions 
(r = 0.180, p = .089). FFMQ did not correlate with EXPLICIT (r = .003, p = .99).
Individual differences in preference judgments
FFMQ showed no main effect on PREFERENCE (F(l, 16) = .164, p = .70). As predicted, FFMQ 
did influence endorsement rates (FFMQ x GRAMMATICALITY x PREFERENCE: F (l, 2284) 
= 28.0, p < .001), shown by the negative correlation between FFMQ and endorsement rates (r 
= -.393, see Figure 3A). In contrast, EXPLICIT did not explain PREFERENCE (main effect: 
F(l,16) = .128, p = .725) or endorsement rates (EXPLICIT x GRAMMATICALITY: F (l, 2284) 
= .404, p = .525, see Figure 3B). To test for a possible dependency (shared variance) between 
FFMQ and EXPLICIT, they were entered separately, resulting in similar outcomes (FFMQ: F (l, 
2284) = 28.0, p < .001, EXPLICIT: F(l,2284) = .423, p = .516).
We performed exploratory analysis to identify which subscales of the FFMQ most strongly 
influenced endorsement rates. Only the non-judgmental subscale would survive multiple- 
comparison corrections (observe: F(l,2284) = .84, p = .028; describe F(l,2284) = 3.77, p = .052; 
acting with awareness: F(l,2284) = 3.38, p = .066; non-judgmental: F(l,2284) = 36.2, p < .001; 
non-reactivity: F(l,2284) = .031, p = .942). The non-judgmental subscale also displayed the best 
predictor estimate, explaining most variance of all the subscales (observe: .001; describe: -.009; 
acting with awareness: -.01; non-judgmental: -.020; non-reactivity: -.001).
Individual differences in grammaticality judgments.
Both FFMQ as well as EXPLICIT showed a significant effect on endorsement rates (FFMQ: 
F(1,2284) = 28.01, p < .001, see Figure 4A; EXPLICIT: F(l,2298) = 18.6, p < .001, see Figure 
4B), caused by a negative correlation with FFMQ (r = -.603), and a positive correlation with 
EXPLICIT (r = .568). To control for a possible influence of LEVENSHTEIN on the negative 
correlation between FFMQ and endorsement rates, we entered LEVENSHTEIN as a control 
variable in a partial correlation analysis. The negative correlation between FFMQ and endorsement 
rates remained large and statistically significant (r = -0.545, p = 0.024).
Similarly as for the preference session, the subscales of the FFMQ were separately tested 
(observe: F(l,2299) = 14.1, p < .001); describe: F(l,2298) = 22.9, p < .001; acting: F(l,2298) = 
7.27, p = .007; non-reactivity: F(l,2294) = 0.916, p = .339; non-judgmental: F(l,2298) = 9.20, p = 
.002). None showed a significant main effect. The describe and observe subscale showed the best
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-.009; non-reactivity: -.005).
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Figure 3. Mindfulness reduces endorsement rate in preference task. Scatter plots showing correlations 
between endorsement rate and mindfulness (A), explicit knowledge (B) and working memory performance 
(C). Endorsement rates were calculated as the percentage of preferred grammatical sequences and disliked 
non-grammatical sequences, as a ratio of the total number of responses. *p <.05, **p <.01.
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grammadcality task. Scatter plots showing correlation between endorsement rate and mindfulness (A), 
explicit knowledge (B) and working memory performance (C). Endorsement rates were calculated as the 
percentage of accepted grammatical sequences and rejected non-grammatical sequences, as a ratio of the 
total number of responses. *p <.05, **p <.01.
Effect of primes on preference judgments
In the preference session, positive primes resulted in marginally faster response times (F(l,1491) 
= 2.87, p = .090, see Figure 5A) and more negative preference judgments (F(l,1499) = 2.62, p = 
.038). Negative primes also resulted in significantly faster response times (F(l,1527) = 6.28, p = 
.012, see Figure 4B), and marginally more negative preference judgments (F(l,1527) = 2.945, p 
= .086). Neither positive (F(l,1499) = 2.618, p = 0.106) nor negative primes (F (l,1531) = 0.042, 
p = 0.837) resulted in an effect on endorsement rate (i.e. in an interaction with grammaticality).
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Figure 5. Positive and negative primes reduce response times and preference ratings. A Effect of positive 
primes on response times and mean endorsement rates on the preference task. B Effect of negatives prime 
on response times and mean endorsement rates on the preference task.
Effect of primes on grammaticality judgments.
In the classification task, positive primes did not result in significant main effects on grammaticality 
judgments (F(l,1497) = 1.10, p = .158), endorsement rates (F(l,1509) = .743, p = .389), or 
response times (F(l,1497) = 0.467, p = 0.495). Negative primes did not result in significant main 
effects on grammaticality judgments (F(l,1538) = 1.96, p = .162) or response times (F(l,1538) 
= .254, p = .615). However, there was a significant interaction effect between endorsement rates 
and the grammatical status of the stimulus (GRAMMATICALITY: F(l,1545) = 4.02, p = .045). 
As can be seen in Figure 6, this interaction was the result of negative primes only affecting 
endorsement of the grammatical sequences.
57
CHAPTER 3. Mindfulness reduces habitual responding based on implicit knowledge
p = .045*
Figure 6. Interaction effect of negative prime and classification performance depends on explicit 
knowledge. Endorsement rates after neutral (NEU) and negative (NEG) primes show that grammatical (G) 
sequences are influenced by negative primes, while non-grammatical (NG) sequences are not.
Discussion
Mindfulness reduces ability to classify grammatical sequences
Mindfulness influenced the endorsement rates in both the preference and grammatical 
classification task. More mindful individuals displayed less sensitivity to the grammar in their 
preference judgments. This effect was repeated for judgments of grammaticality. Importantly, 
mindfulness did not correlate with initial WM performance. Also, after explicitly controlling for 
differences in initial working memory performance, the effects of mindfulness on endorsement 
rates remained large and statistically significant. Furthermore, mindfulness did not correlate with 
the ability to later recall explicit knowledge about the grammar. Together, these findings suggest 
that while mindfulness impairs both implicit as explicit classification performance, it does not 
reduce the ability to report bigram knowledge about the grammar or to perform general cognitive 
operations on similar stimuli. Thus, mindfulness specifically explained individual differences in 
endorsement of grammatical structures that cannot be explained by general cognitive abilities or 
the ability to verbally express the implicit knowledge base.
Post-hoc investigation of mindfulness subscales
Post-hoc analysis of the separate subscales of the FFMQ further substantiate an explanation 
of the effects of mindfulness in terms of non-habitual factors. The negative correlation of
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mindfulness with endorsement rates in the preference task was strongest for the non-judging 
of inner experience subscale. This subscale refers to a non-evaluative stance toward thoughts 
and feelings (Baer et a l ., 2008). Within the context of the implicit classification task, preference 
judgments might have been less biased by interna! representation of the grammatical structure. 
This would be consistent with the claim that mindfulness down-plays a general tendency to 
automatically judge internal representations (Brown &  Ryan (2003) and B ishop et al . (2004)). 
Interestingly, when participants explicitly judged the grammaticality of the stimuli, the describe 
and observe subscale emerged as the most significant predictor of impaired performance. The 
describe subscale refers to the labelling of inner experiences with words. The observing subscale 
refers to the noticing or attending to internal and external experiences (Baer et al ., 2008). The 
fact that such dispositions were not beneficial for grammaticality judgments implies that an 
observing and describing trait inhibits (automatic) acting on internal representations, i.e. using 
the ‘gut feeling’. This would be in line with findings showing that such classification performance 
benefits from instructing subjects not to over-analyze the stimuli or their performance (H oward 
&  H oward, 2001). Taken together, these results suggest that implicit knowledge is most reliably 
accessed by those that rely on habitual responses. Knowledge about the fact that grammatical rules 
exist (after debriefing) does not change this relationship. Furthermore, a tendency to observe (i.e., 
to be aware of one’s thoughts, feelings and preferences) might reduce such habitual responses.
Explicit knowledge and working memory
It is important to note that neither WM performance nor explicit knowledge interacted with 
endorsement rates in the preference session, but did so significandy after subjects were debriefed. 
This suggests a qualitative difference between implicit and explicit classification, consistent 
with the understanding that that explicit knowledge about the grammar was used in the explicit 
classification but not during implicit endorsement rates. Similar findings were reported by Folia 
et al. (2008) who found that the number of grammatical items that participants were able to 
generate, predicted endorsement rates for grammaticality classification but not for preference 
ratings.
Interestingly, while previous work (K aufman et al ., 2010) has shown that working memory capacity 
is not a major source of variance in AGL performance, WM performance did correlate positively 
with grammatical classification in our study. However, in contrast to Kaufman et al., (K aufman et 
al ., 2010) who used an independent task to measure working memory (the Operation Span Task 
(Turner &  E ngle, 1989), our WM task shared both the grammatical structure with classification 
stimuli as well as the surface features such as the typeface and presentation duration. The WM 
task should therefore be considered less of a measurement of general WM capacity but rather of
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a task-specific ability to hold relevant sequences online, specific for our task context. Note that 
the correlation between WM and explicit knowledge does not imply that WM performance was 
contaminated by (implicit) understanding of grammar. WM performance in the first session did 
not correlate significantly with endorsement rates of preference judgments. The last two working 
memory sessions did show a marginal trend towards significance. However, as participants learned 
the grammar, that knowledge would have facilitated the remembering of sequences in what 
constituted the WM task. As such, given that mindfulness appears to limit the learning (or at least 
the expression of that knowledge) this could have resulted in a negatdve correlation between WM 
and the FFMQ score. It should also be noted that the negative relationship between mindfulness 
and endorsement rates occurred for both the preference and classification task, while working 
memory performance only showed a correlation with the latter. Further evidence speaking 
against the possibility that the negative correlation between mindfulness and endorsement rates 
was mediated through a mutual correlation with (working) memory ability, comes from studies 
on the relationship between mindfulness and memory. In Jha et al., (2010) and Zeidan et al. 
(2010) mindfulness training was found to increase working memory performance. Furthermore, 
in Williams et al. (2000) mindfulness training increased autobiographical memory specificity in 
recovered depressed patients, which was repücated by Heeren et al. (2009) in healthy subjects. 
Lastly, working memory performance has been previously shown not to correlate with implicit 
learning performance (G ebauer &  M acktntosh, 2007 and Reber  et al. 1991). Taken together, we 
believe it is unlikely that individual differences in WM ability meditated the negative correlation 
between mindfulness and performance on the grammatical classification and preference task.
Primes
To test the involvement of affect on the retrieval of implicit knowledge, we preceded stimuli with 
subliminal affective primes. Preference ratings were found to be faster and preferred less when 
preceded by a negative prime. Negative primes did not have an effect on endorsement rates. 
This is consistent with an effect of prime on the response level, but not with an influence on 
the decision process itself. In fact, while affective primes are classically assumed to automatically 
activate attitudes towards target stimuli (e.g. Fazio et al., 1986 and F orgas, 1995), it has been 
argued that affective primes also influence decisions regarding the attitude towards the response, 
instead ofthe stimuli that the response is about (H ermans, D e H ouwer, &  E elen , 2001). Our 
findings would be consistent with the latter.
Unexpectedly, positive primes showed a similar effect as negative primes, both speeding up 
response times and biasing preference judgments negatively. No interactions with prime valence 
were observed. A series of studies on the differential effects of the valence of primes used 
forty-eight and one-hundred-and-sixty participants (Rotteveel et ai.., 2001). Our study might
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therefore have suffered from a lack of power. However, a more parsimonious explanation would 
be that affective primes resulted in a general disruptive effect on the accuracy of implicit decision- 
making that was independent of prime valence. Our results suggest a general tradeoff between 
an increased speed of response and a decreased accuracy, after both positive and negative primes.
Interestingly, when participants explicitly rated grammaticality (after debriefing), primes did not 
have an effect on participants’ judgment. As grammaticality judgments took about 200 ms longer 
than preference ratings, priming effects could by then have dissipated. In fact, priming effects 
degrade quickly over time, with the maximal effect obtained by a prime-mask SOA from 100 ms 
to 150 ms, with barely any effects after 300 ms (Hermans et al., 2001; Sohrabi & W est, 2009). 
Alternatively, response times might have been less informative than in preference judgments due 
to more elaborate conscious decision-making processes.
Explicit knowledge of bigram transitions
The method by which explicit knowledge o f  bigrams was measured might o ffe r several 
improvements over previously used methods. Open questions suffer from  a possible lack o f  
sensitivity, due to low  confidence, different retrieval contexts or the absence o f  appropriate words 
to describe the knowledge base (Destrebecqz & Peigneux, 2005; Shanks & St. J ohn, 1994). On  
the other hand, forced-choice recognition or sequences-completion tasks, although being more 
sensitive, suffer from  the unavoidable problem that the use o f  (unconscious) implicit knowledge 
in their responses cannot be excluded (i.e., the exclusiveness criterion, see Reingold & M erikle, 
1988 and D estrebecqz & Peigneux, 2005). Sampling knowledge o f  all bi-gram transitions with 
multiple-choice questions helps participants report bigram knowledge by providing a minimal 
structure in which the questions are contextualized. By penalizing misses and false alarms 
response biases can be controlled for. Secondly, the pen-and-paper form at provides a different 
context in which implicit strategies are expected to play less o f  a role than in setups similar in 
task context. Note that we only sampled the bi-gram space and higher-order knowledge was not 
probed. However, given the complexity o f  higher-order rules, it is unlikely that such knowledge 
was accessible or used. In fact, none o f  our subjects reported higher level (tri-gram) rules in the 
free recall questions o f  the post-experiment questionnaire.
Conclusion
To conclude, mindfulness reduced habitual responding to unconsdously acquired preferences, 
providing expetimental evidence for its core concepts: a non-reactive and non-judgmental 
disposition. Combined with our findings on the influence of affective primes, we show the 
importance of affective traits and states in implicit learning and retrieval.
61

CHAPTER 4. Covert somatosensory attention is metacognitively accessible
4
Covert somatosensory attention is metacognitively 
accessible8
Abstract
Studies on metacognition have shown that participants can report on their performance in a 
wide range of perceptual, memory and behavioral tasks. We know litde, however, about the 
neuronal substrate reflecting the ability to report on one’s attentional focus. The degree and 
direction of somatosensory attention can, however, be readily discerned through suppression of 
alpha band frequencies in EEG/MEG produced by the somatosensory cortex. Such top-down 
attentional modulations of cortical excitability have been shown to result in better discrimination 
performance and decreased response times. In this study we asked whether the degree of attentional 
focus is also accessible for subjective report, and whether such evaluations correspond to the 
amount of somatosensory alpha activity. In response to auditory cues participants maintained 
somatosensory attention to either their left or right hand for intervals varying randomly between 
five and 32 seconds, while their brain activity was recorded with MEG. Trials were terminated 
by a probe sound, to which they reported their level of attention on the cued hand right before 
probe-onset. Using a beamformer approach, we quantified the alpha activity in left and right 
somatosensory regions, one second before the probe. Alpha activity from contra- and ipsilateral 
somatosensory cortices for high versus low attention trials were compared. As predicted, the 
contralateral somatosensory alpha depression correlated with higher reported attentional focus. 
Finally, alpha activity two to three seconds before the probe-onset correlated with attentional 
focus. We conclude that somatosensory attention is indeed accessible to metacognitive awareness.
8 Based on: Whitmarsh S., Schoffelen J., Barendregt H.P., Jensen O., (in press) Metacognitive awareness of covert
somatosensory attention corresponds to contralateral alpha power, Neurolmage
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Introduction
Metacognition refers to the general ability to reflect upon, and comment on mental states and 
cognitive processes. Traditionally, metacognition has been an important concept in understanding 
failure in m em ory perform ance such as false recognition and tip-of-the-tongue (for an overview  
see Metcalfe and S himamura, 1994 and D unlosky and Bjork, 2008). M ore recently the concept 
o f  metacognition has been embraced by a broader range o f  cognitive neuroscience researchers. 
In cognitive tasks requiring a behavioural response, the ability to report confïdence about one’s 
perform ance has been used as paradigmatic example o f  metacognition (Fleming & D olan, 2012). 
In the perceptual domain metacognitive reports are taken as reflecting conscious awareness o f  the 
percept, both in human (K unimoto, Miller, & Pashler, 2001; Szczepanowski & Pessoa, 2007) and 
non-human research (Smith, Couchman, & Beran, 2012). However, in some cases metacognition 
might be simply understood as second-order behaviour, i.e. as behaviour that is contingent on 
other (overt o r nascent) behaviour, rather than on knowledge that is based on meta-cognition 
(Fleming, D olan, & Frith, 2012). This issue is particularly relevant in studies o f  attention, where 
so far metacognition has only been investigated within the context o f  behavioural performance. 
Such experimental paradigms permit metacognitive reports to be based on perform ance and 
stimulus processing, rather than on introspection o f  the cognitive (attentional) state. The prim ary 
objective o f  this study was therefore to show that attentional focus is metacognitive accessible, 
independently from  the task perform ance or exogenous stimulus processing.
Neuroimaging techniques can disambiguate the metacognitive accessibility o f  attention by 
providing objective proxies o f  covert attention. Visuospatial and somatosensory attention can be 
gauged using magnetoencephalography (MEG) o r electroencephalography (EEG) measurements 
o f  the 10 Hz rhythms found in the visual and somatosensory cortex (Hari & Salmelin, 1997 
and Pfurtscheller & Lopes da Silva, 1999). It is now a well-replicated finding that alpha 
activity decreases contralateral to the focus o f  attention, during visuospatial attention (Handel, 
Haarmeier, & J ensen, 2011; K elly, G omez-Ramirez, & Foxe, 2009; Rihs, M ichel, & Thut, 
2007; Thut, et al., 2006; van G erven & J ensen, 2009; W orden et al., 2000) as well as during 
som atosensory attention (Haegens, Handel, & J ensen, 2011; Haegens, Luther, & J ensen, 
2012; Schubert, et al., 2009; van Ede, de L ange, J ensen, & Maris, 2011; van E de, J ensen, 
& M aris, 2010). Furthermore, visual and som atosensory alpha power have been shown to be 
modulated according to attentional demands (G ould, Rushworth, & N obre, 2011; Haegens et 
al ., 2011), affecting subsequent perform ance (Bengson, M angun, & M azaheri, 2012; Haegens 
et al., 2011; Handel et al., 2011; K elly et al., 2009; O ’Connell et al., 2009; Thut et al., 
2006). These findings show evidence for the attentional role o f  visual and som atosensory alpha 
through their role in augmenting and attenuating task relevant and irrelevant regions, respectively 
(Klimesch, 1999; Neuper and Pfurtscheller, 2001; Schack and K limesch, 2002; J ensen 
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and M azaheri, 2010). In fact, combined EEG-fM RI studies have shown that posterior alpha 
power correlates negatively with visual BOLD activity (Scheeringa et al., 2011), while central 
alpha power correlates negatively with BOLD in somatosensory regions (Ritter, M oosmann & 
V illringer, 2009). Taken together, alpha power has been shown to be sensitive both the degree 
as well as the location of covert visuospatial and somatosensory attention.
Previous work suggests that attention might be metacognitively accessible. In a recent EEG study, 
Macdonald and colleagues (2011) let participants report their level of attention during each trial in 
a visual discrimination task. Self-reported attention on task correlated negatively with pre-stimulus 
alpha power. In Braboszcz and Delorme (2011), subjects were instructed to count their breath 
and report by button-press whenever they noticed a distraction from the task. Posterior alpha and 
central beta power were shown to be reduced preceding these reports of mind-wandering. These 
findings were interpreted in terms of impaired working-memory during mind-wandering. In 
Christoff and colleagues (2009), attention was sampled during a sustained attention task (SART, 
Robertson et al. (1997)). Moments of mind-wandering were shown not to be associated with any 
decreases of BOLD activity in task-related regions. Rather, they were reflected by a pattern of 
increased activity in both executive regions (dorsal ACC and the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex) 
and the default network (medial PFC, posterior cingulate and posterior temporo-parietal cortex), 
consistent with previous reports of default mode network activity during mind-wandering (Mason 
et al., 2007). Interestingly, this effect was found to be reduced when participants reported to have 
been aware of being distracted, suggesting that mind-wandering was most pronounced when it 
lacked metacognition. Taken together, these findings suggest that the attentional state during task 
performance might be metacognitively accessible. However, it remains an open question whether 
metacognition of attention can occur in the absence of a concurrent task.
The current study was designed to measure metacognition of attention independentiy from 
concurrent task performance and stimulus processing. Participants were instructed to try to 
maintain maximal attention to their left or right hand as indicated by auditory cues. At random 
periods after the cue, trials were terminated by a probe sound. A button-press was then used to 
self-report the degree in which attention was directed to the cued hand at the moment preceding 
the probe sound. These subjective self-reports were associated with alpha as an objective proxy 
of attention. For this purpose, MEG was used in combination with the beamformer method to 
estimate alpha power at the left and right somatosensory cortex. We hypothesized that trials with 
higher self-reported attention would be associated with lower alpha power in the contralateral 
somatosensory region. Confirmation of this hypothesis permitted us to conclude that the 
attentional focus is indeed metacognitively accessible.
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Methods
Participants
Fifteen healthy participants (9 female, mean age 30.4 years, range: 19—63) enrolled after 
providing written informed consent and were paid in accordance with guidelines of the local 
ethics committee (CMO Committee on Research Involving Humans subjects, region Arnhem- 
Nijmegen, the Netherlands). One participant was excluded from the analysis due to excessive 
movement artifacts. The experiment was in compliance with national legislation as well as the 
code of ethical principles (Declaration of Helsinki).
Experiment
Participants were instructed to continuously attend to the cued hand while simultaneously trying 
to remain aware of their attentive state until a probe sound (2000Hz tone) was presented (Figure 
IA). Cues consisted of two sequential tones of 400ms each, 200ms apart, with either ascending 
in pitch for the right hand (2000Hz followed by 2500Hz) or descending for the left hand (2000Hz 
followed by 1500Hz). Cue side was determined pseudo-randomly. Cue-probe intervals followed 
an exponential distribution with a mean of 3 seconds and a cut-off time of 27 seconds, providing 
a flat hazard rate. In other words, the chance of the probe occurring after trial onset was held 
constant. A minimal cue-probe interval of 5 seconds was added, resulting in an average cue-probe 
interval of 8 seconds and maximal of 32 seconds. After the probe sound, participants evaluated 
their level of attention on the cued hand using one out of four options: (1) not at all, (2) little, 
(3) much, (4) fully/maximally attentive. The experiment started with a training session, followed 
by three continuous blocks of 125 trials separated by self-paced breaks. The response hand at 
the first session was determined randomly, and then switched for each block. To minimize head 
movements and provide comfort participants were measured in supine position. To minimize eye 
movements and blinks and increase the chance of fluctuations in attentional focus, participants 
were instructed to remain with their eyes closed throughout the experiment.
Data Preprocessing
Continuous MEG data was recorded using a 275-sensor axial gradiometer system (CTF MEG 
TM Systems In c ., Port Coquitlam, BC, Canada) placed in a magnetically shielded room. The 
ongoing MEG signals were low-pass filtered at 300 Hz, digitized at 1200  Hz, and stored for o ff- 
line analysis. The subjects’ head position was continuously recorded relative to the gradiometer 
array using coils positioned at the subject’s nasion and at the left and right ear canals. High- 
resolution anatomical images (1 mm isotropic voxel size) were acquired using a 1.5-T  Siemens 
Magnetom Sonata system (Erlangen, G ermany). The same earplugs, using vitamin E instead
66
CHAPTER 4. Covert somatosensory attention is metacognitively accessible
of the coils, were used for co-registration with the MEG data. MEG data was analyzed using 
the Matiab-based Fieldtrip toolbox, developed at the Donders Institute for Brain, Cognition and 
Behavior (Oostenveld, Fries, Maris, & Schoffelen, 2011). Trials containing movement, muscle, 
and superconducting quantum interference device (SQUID) jumps were discarded by visual 
inspection. Independent component analysis (ICA) was used to remove eye and heart artifacts.
paradigm B example design matrix
V -
m ax. 32 seconds
Figure 1. Schematic of paradigm and example of the design matrix used for the source level General Linear 
Model. A Schematic depiction of paradigm showing timing parameters of trial. B Example design matrix 
showing regressors for conditions (O’s and l*s) and confound regressors (normalized).
Source Reconstruction of Alpha Power
Source reconstruction was performed using a frequency-domain beamformer approach (Dynamic 
Imaging of Coherent Sources) which uses adaptive spatial filters to localize power in the entire 
brain (Gross et al., 2001 and Liljestrom, et al. 2005). The brain volume of each individual 
subject was discretized to a grid with a 0.8-cm resolution. For every grid point a spatial filter 
was constructed from the cross-spectral density matrix and the lead field. The lead fields were 
calculated from a subject specific realistic single-shell model of the brain (Nolte, 2003), based 
on the individual anatomical MRls. We calculated the cross-spectral density matrix based upon 
the full interval between cue offset and probe onset to obtain the most accurate estimation of 
the alpha sources. Individual alpha frequencies were used for each subject (for all grid and dme 
points), determined by the maximum log power between 7 and 15 Hz on all trials and sensors.
For each grid point and six one-second time segment preceding probe onset, alpha activity was then 
estimated. A sufficiënt number of trials (~100) had trial lengths of at least 6 seconds preceding 
probe onset to enable source statistics at those intervals. A (Slepian) multitaper approach was 
used to accomplish accurate frequency smoothing (± 2 Hz) around the subject-specific alpha 
peaks. To enable valid voxel-by-voxel comparisons in the face of the beamformer depth bias,
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alpha estimates were standardized over trials.
Source level GLM
A voxel-by-voxel first-level GLM approach was then used for every subject and time segment. 
Figure 1B shows an example design matrix, including cue side (left/right) and self-report (high/ 
low), dichotomized according to a median split per subject and time-point. In addition, trial 
number as well as the mean X, Y and Z position of the three fiducial coils were entered as separate 
regressors. The locations of the fiducial coils indicate the position of anatomical landmarks of 
the subject’s head (nasion and pre-auricular points) in the MEG helmet. By including the average 
fiducial positions during each trial, variance that was caused by differences in head position 
over trials was also reduced. To further reduce variance that could be explained by response 
preparation, regressors for evaluation response times and cue-probe duration were added to the 
GLM, together with separate regressors for the response hand, which was switched between each 
block and randomized over subjects. The cue side and self-report predictors consisted of O’s and 
I ’s, thereby yielding mean standardized alpha power after multiplication with the standardized 
data. By standardizing the remaining covariates (response time, trial length, fiducial position, etc) 
multiplication with the standardized data resulted in correlation values (r). Prior to averaging and 
group statistics, the resulting beta-values and correlations values were spatially normalized using 
SPM2 to the International Consortium for Brain Mapping template (M ontreal N eurological 
Institute, M N I, M ontreal, Q C , Canada).
Functional localization of primary somatosensory regions
After the reconstruction of alpha power for each voxel and time-point, somatosensory regions 
of interest (ROIs) were determined based on alpha power during the last second preceding probe 
onset. A voxel-by-voxel comparison was made between left and right attention trials. A cluster- 
based permutation test (M aris &  O ostenveld, 2007) was then used to identify significant spatial 
clusters. This resulted in a distinct somatosensory alpha-ROI for each hemisphere. Each ROI 
therefore depended on cue condition (left versus right), but remained independent of the self- 
reported evaluation of attention.
Region of interest analysis
Alpha power values within the left and right ROI voxels were averaged according to cue condition 
(ipsi versus contra), evaluation (high versus low) and time-point (six one-second intervals 
preceding probe onset). The effects of cue condition and evaluation on mean alpha power were 
tested over time using repeated measures ANOVA. Differences in these effects over time were 
tested using post-hoc t-tests per time-point.
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Results
Participants were instructed to try to maintain maximal attention to either their left or right 
hand as indicated by auditory cues. At random periods after the cue, trials were terminated by 
another (probe) sound. After each trial participants reported by button-press (1 to 4) the degree 
of attention that was allocated to the cued hand at the moment right before the probe sound.
Behavior
Attentional focus fluctuated over time, as reflected by the use of the full range of responses 
(Figure 2A). The number of responses per evaluation, differed significandy (F(3) = 9.896, p < 
0.001), showing a linear relationship (F(l) = 24.778, p < 0.001), with evaluations being generally 
high. This shows that participants were confident about their performance. Evaluation times 
also differed for the different levels (Figure 2B; F(3) = 28.739, p < 0.001). Evaluations that 
were rated high were also made quicker, showing again a linear trend (F(l) = 47.133, p < 0.001). 
Furthermore, evaluation times correlated negatively with cue-probe duration (mean r = -0.130, 
t(13) = -5.5048, p = < 0.001), showing that longer cue-probe durations did not result in a loss of 
vigilance or ability to do the task.
A B
evaluation of attention evaluation of attention
Figure 2. Behavioral differences between evaluation responses. A Distribution of trials according to 
evaluation of attention show that attention was generally rated high. B Evaluation times were reduced
when attention was evaluated higher.
Functional localization of primary somatosensory regions
Somatosensory' alpha regions of interest (ROIs) were determined on the basis of the distribution 
of alpha power in the brain volume estimate using the beamformer approach applied to the 
M E G  data during the last second before probe onset. A cluster-based permutation test (M aris
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& O ostenveld, 2007) was used to identify the significant clusters responsive to cue direction. 
The analysis resulted in two significant clusters, one in each hemisphere in primary sensorimotor 
areas (see Figure 3). These ROIs were used for further analysis of the alpha power preceding 
metacognitive evaluations. For this purpose estimates of alpha power in the left and right 
hemispheric ROI’s were separated into an ipsi-lateral ROI and a contra-lateral ROI on the basis 
of hemisphere and cue direction. In other words, ipsi-lateral alpha power consisted of the left 
ROI during left-attention trials, and the right ROI during right-attention trials. Similarly, contra- 
lateral alpha power consisted of the left ROI during right-attention trials and the right ROI 
during left-attention trials. The ipsi-contra distinction was therefore orthogonal to the left-right 
hemisphere distinction.
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Figure 3. Somatosensory alpha power lateralized in response to cue direction. Source reconstructed alpha 
activity during one second preceding probe-onset shows clear lateralization at primary somatosensory 
regions. Significant voxels were thresholded based on cluster-permutation (M aris &  O o sten veld , 2007).
Region of interest analysis
Alpha power was first averaged over grid points in the left and right ROI and over the six seconds 
interval preceding probe onset. As predicted, differences in self-reported evaluation corresponded 
to differences in preceding alpha power, showing lower alpha power for high attention versus low 
attention (F(l,13) = 7.163, p = 0.019; Compare top panel with bottom panel in Figure 4A and 
4B). We then went on to analyze alpha power preceding probe onset in a time-resolved, post-hoc 
manner, to investigate the temporal profile of alpha activity preceding probe onset (Figure 4C and 
4D, respectively). Only the contralateral ROI showed significant differences between high and 
low evaluations, for the last 3 seconds preceding probe onset (two-tailed: [-3:-2] t(13) = -2.357, p 
= 0.035; [-2:-l] t(13) = 0.017; [-1:0] t(13) = -2.648, p = 0.020).
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Figure 4. Topographic and time-resolved difference in alpha power show consistency with self reported 
attention. A Surface plot of Standard MNI brain showing mean standardized alpha power on the contralateral 
hemisphere for the 6 seconds preceding probe onset, separately for high- and low-attention. B Surface plot 
of Standard MNI brain showing mean standardized alpha power on the ipsilateral hemisphere for the 6 
seconds preceding probe onset, separately for high- and low-attention. C Time resolved alpha power for 6 
seconds preceding probe onset, based on contralateral region-of-interest (see Figure 3), separately for high- 
and low-attention. Asterisks depict significant differences between high- and low-attention on separate 
time points. Shaded surface represents Standard error of mean. D Time resolved alpha power for 6 seconds 
preceding probe onset, based contralateral region-of-interest (see Figure 3), separately for high- and low- 
attention. Curve width represents Standard error of mean.
HIGH ATTENTION 
LOW ATTENTION
-4 -3 -2 
time (seconds)
D 
IPSI-LATE RALCONTRA-LATERAL
71
CHAPTER 4. Covert somatosensory attention is metacognitivelj accessible 
Confound regressors analysis
Control regressors were used to control for variance due to potential differences in response 
times, cue-probe duration, elapsed time (trial number) and movement (3D position of fiducial 
coils). These regressors were standardized and entered as covariates in the design matrix. Resultant 
correlation values (r) were tested against zero using cluster-based permutation tests (Maris & 
Oostenveld, 2007). Cue-probe duration was shown to be significandy positively correlated 
with superior-parietal alpha power, and this correlation was shown to be maintained over time 
(Figure 5A). This means that alpha activity in these regions gradually increased as the trial became 
longer. Response time correlated with some alpha activity at somatosensory and visual regions, 
although these effects did not remain signifïcance for any extended period of time (Figure 5B). 
In conclusion, the level of subjective attention was mainly reflected by contralateral alpha in 
somatosensory regions and was not confounded by correlations with response times or cue- 
probe interval.
time to probe (seconds)
---------1 |--------------- 1--------------- r
time to probe (seconds) 
correlation alpha and evaluation time
correlation alpha and cue-probe duration
Figure 5. Parietal alpha power correlates with cue-probe duration, not with evaluation time. A Cluster- 
statistics shows significant correlations between superior-parietal alpha and cue-probe duration, consistent 
over time before probe-onset. B No consistent correlations between alpha power and evaluation times were
found.
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Discussion
The main purpose of this study was to investigate whether the degree of somatosensory attentional 
focus is metacognitively accessible, as shown by a correspondence between contralateral alpha 
and self-reported attentional focus. As a prerequisite for our study, alpha activity produced in 
primary somatosensory regions was first shown to be hemispherically lateralized in response to 
cued attention to the left or right hand. Furthermore, by demonstrating significant lateralization 
in the somatosensory cortex during the second preceding probe onset, it was shown that 
this lateralization can be sustained for extended periods of time (from 8 to 32 seconds). The 
main finding was that participants’ subjective rating of their attentional focus was reflected in 
somatosensory alpha power contralateral to the attended hand. This somatotopic specificity 
supports the notion that participants were not reporting on a general attentional state, but were 
able to report specifically on their attentional sensory specific focus. This study therefore provides 
strong support for the metacognitive accessibility of attentional focus. Moreover, this is the first 
study showing metacognition in the absence of either exogenous stimulation or evaluations 
of task performance based on overt behavior. Furthermore, response times were shown not 
to contribute to somatosensory alpha power, supporting the behavioral independence of our 
findings.
O ur findings are consistent with previous electrophysiological studies on metacognition. A 
previous investigation by Braboszcz and D elorm e (2011) showed reduced posterior alpha during 
mind-wandering, which the authors interpreted in terms o f  impaired working-m em ory processes. 
However, the role o f  alpha oscillations during working m em ory has also been understood to 
reflect active inhibition o f  task-unrelated activity, suppressing visual processes during mem ory 
retention (Jensen & M azaheri, 2010; K limesch, 1999; N euper & Pfurtscheller, 2001; Schack 
& K limesch, 2002). The results o f  Braboszcz and D elorm e (2011) could therefore have reflected 
mal-adaptive attention to visual processes during mind-wandering. This would put their findings 
in line with ours, providing converging evidence fo r the metacognitive accessibility o f  the interna! 
attentional state. A recent sophisticated EEG study by Macdonald and colleagues (2011) found  
a negative correlation between pre-stimulus parieto-occipital alpha power and self-reported  
attention during a visual detection task. Interestingly, parieto-occipital alpha and self-reported  
attention correlated over periods o f  several minutes. Such slow fluctuations o f  attention are 
in accordance with O ’Connell et al. (2009), where lapses in visual attention were preceded by 
increased parieto-occipital alpha fo r  at least 20 seconds before an error occurred. Importantly, 
neither O ’Connell and colleagues (2009) nor Macdonald and colleagues (2011) used cued spatial 
attention, but rather correlated self-reports with the measurement o f  general visual attention. 
O ur data extends these findings by showing that self-reported attentional focus corresponds 
m ost strongly with contra-lateral (to cued side) somatosensory alpha. This demonstrates that
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the correlation between self-report and alpha activity can be spatially specific. In other words, 
while the findings by O’Connell and colleagaes (2009) and Macdonald and colleagues (2011) 
suggest metacognitive access to the visual attentional state, our findings provide strong evidence 
for metacognitive access to spatial focus as well.
Previous work has shown, that in visuospatial (Fu et al., 2001; K elly, L alor, R eilly, &  Foxe, 
2006; W orden et al., 2000) and somatosensory attention tasks (Haegens et al., 2012), the 
inclusion of distracting stimuli at the un-cued side can result in an increase of ipsilateral alpha 
power, reflecting active suppression of the distracting sensations. In the current experiment, 
participants were only required to attend continuously to the cued hand while no distractors were 
presented. Consistent with the idea that sensations from the un-cued hand posed litde challenge 
and did not need to be actively inhibited, alpha power tended to be lower rather than higher at 
the ipsilateral hemisphere when attention was reported to be higher, although they did not do so 
significandy. This suggests that metacognitive reports were not based on the unattended hand. 
Future experiments, however, could investigate the potential to not only report on the degree of 
attention, but also on the degree of suppression of distraction.
Interestingly, in our analysis o f  confound regressors, cue-probe duration was found to correlate 
positively with superior parietal alpha power at regions. The superior parietal lobule (SPL), in 
particular the inferior parietal sulcus (IPS), has been implicated in body-centered coding (Galati 
et al., 2010) and m ovem ent preparation (Cohen & A ndersen, 2002). Furthermore, the SPL/ 
IPS is considered part o f  the Dorsal A ttention NetWork (DAN; Corbetta & Schulman, 2002 
& 2011), involved in goal-directed orientation o f  attention. N ot much is known about the role 
o f  SPL alpha oscillations, however. The question remains i f  superior-parietal alpha has similar 
inhibitory effects as in sensory regions (Jensen & M azaheri, 2010; K limesch, 1999; N euper 
& Pfurtscheller, 2001; Schack & K limesch, 2002). A  recent study on parietal alpha o f  local 
field potentials in the macaque monkey (Premereur, V anduffel, & J anssen, 2012) does suggest 
that parietal alpha actively inhibits the onset o f  target-oriented saccades, consistent with the 
involvem ent o f  parietal alpha in encoding gaze-centered reference-frames (Buchholz, J ensen, 
& M edendorp, 2011; V an D er W erf, B uchholz, J ensen, & M edendorp, 2012). A s a matter o f  
speculation, our results could therefore suggest increased suppression o f  reorienting activity with  
increasing trial duration.
Decades ago, Narens and Nelson (Nelson & Narens, 1994) argued eloquendy fo r metacognition 
as a topic o f  interest in its own right as well as a bridge between many areas o f  cognitive and 
psychological investigation, e.g, between decision making and memory, learning and motivation. 
Recendy, action and perceptual processes have been added to this list (see Fleming et al., 2012) 
fo r an overview) and with our and other recent studies (Braboszcz & D elorme, 2011; Christoff
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et al ., 2009; Macdonald et al., 2011), attention and mind-wandering as well. This speaks to the 
general role o f  metacognition as cognitive processes that m onitor and control cognition (cf. e.g., 
Fernandez-D uque, Baird, & P osner, 2000). According to metacognitive principles, cognition 
can be split into two interrelated levels: the metalevel and the object level (Nelson & Narens, 
1990). W hile the metalevel is continuously updated by bottom -up inform ation, it asserts Controls 
over the object level by providing top-down input and initiating or terminating its actions (Nelson 
& Narens, 1990). In this light, our measure o f  somatosensory attention reflects the subservient 
object level rather than the metalevel. O ur paradigm did not enable a valid comparison between 
trials in which metacognition was present and trials where it was absent. However, a recent study 
on interoception o f  event-times (G uggisberg, D alal, Schnider, & N agarajan, 2011) has done 
so. Interestingly, the patterns o f  neural activity that was related to introspection depended on the 
target o f  introspection, i.e., whether it concerned auditory perception, intentional or m otor events. 
Each was related to a specific introspection-related network. A long similar lines, future studies 
can be expected to delineate frontal brain networks that are specifically involved in metacognitive 
m onitoring o f  attention. Such research could take into account the rich literature on executive 
control in metacognition (see e.g., Botvinick et al., 2001 and Fernandez-D uque et al., 2000) 
as well as recent models o f  attention that organize brain networks in terms o f  their relationship 
to internal goals and external cues (e.g, Corbetta & Shulman, 2002 and Miller & D ’E sposito,
2005). O ur data suggests that part o f  the introspective process might involve the maintenance 
o f  attention through the suppression o f  reorienting responses arising from  the D orsal Attention  
N etwork (Corbetta & S hulman, 2002, 2011).
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5
Mindfulness meditation enables proactive 
metacognition of attention
Abstract
The distinguishing practice of mindfulness meditation is the intentional regulation of attention 
towards the present moment. Mindfulness meditation therefore emphasizes metacognitive 
functions, in particular the ability to monitor the attentional focus on a moment-by-moment 
basis. In this study we set out to test whether mindfulness meditation experience is associated 
with an increased ability to monitor moment-by-moment fluctuation in the attentional state. In 
response to auditory cues, participants maintained somatosensory attention to either their left or 
right hand. At random moments, trials were terminated by a probe sound to which participants 
reported their level of attention at that moment. MEG was recorded during the attention interval 
preceding probe onset. Using a beamformer approach, alpha activity in contralateral primary 
somatosensory regions was quantified. Alpha activity for self-reported high versus low attention 
trials was compared both within and between groups of either highly experienced experienced 
mindfulness meditators, novice meditators or meditation-naive participants (controls). As 
predicted, generally contralateral alpha power was associated with self-reported attention. Novice 
meditators (<1000hrs of meditation) showed temporal profiles similar to Controls, displaying a 
correspondence between self-report and alpha power preceding probe onset. Expert meditators 
(>>1000hrs) showed a strikingly different pattern, however. Their self-reported attentional 
state corresponded with alpha power during a more extended time interval preceding those of 
Controls and novice meditators. In addition, self-reported low attention trials showed a distinctive 
alpha suppression preceding probe onset, suggesting that the ability for moment-by-moment 
monitoring of the attentional state permitted greater attentional control.
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Introduction
The goal o f  this study is to investigate whether extensive meditation experience can be associated 
with changes in meta-metacognitive monitoring o f  attention. W hile meditation practices are 
generally considered to incorporate the practice o f  attentional control, mindfulness meditation 
distinguishes itself by an emphasis on continuous metacognitive monitoring o f  mental contents 
and processes (Lutz e t  a l .,  2006 & 2008). Mindfulness based interventions have been proven  
successful in treating a wide range o f  clinical syndromes ranging from  depression (Chiesa & 
S e r re tt i ,  2011; P ie t & H oug aard , 2011; van  A a ld e re n  e t  a l., 2012) to anxiety (Roemer & O rs illo ,  
2002; W u rtze n  e t  a l., 2012) and ADHD (Zylow ska e t  a l., 2008). Several clinical interventions 
have integrated mindfulness, e.g. in Mindfulness Based Stress Reduction (MBCT, K abat-Z inn  
1990a, 1994), Mindfulness Based Cognitive Therapy (Seg a l e t  a l., 2002; T easdale e t  a l ., 1995) 
and Acceptance and Comm itment Therapy (S teven  C. Hayes, S tro sa h l, & W ilso n , 1999). The 
mechanisms by which mindfulness meditation might benefit the mental health o f  the practitioner 
remain unclear, however. Initial proposals have been put forward from  cognitive psychological 
(e.g. B aer, 2003 and B row n, Ryan & C resw ell, 2007) or neuroscientific perspectives (e.g. Chiesa 
& S e r re t t i ,  2010a; H o lz e l e t  a l., 2011 an d  T ang & Posner, 2013). in which mindfulness has 
been defined in terms o f  “paying attention in a particular way: on purpose, in the present moment, 
and nonjudgmentally” (Jon K abat-Z inn, 1994) or “the state o f  being attentive to and aware o f  
what is taking place in the present” (Brown & Ryan, 2003 and similarly in Bishop e t  ai,. 2004). 
The practice o f  mindfulness meditation is therefore understood beyond the ability to maintain 
attention upon a specific object o r to safeguard oneself from  (especially negative) distraction. 
Rather, mindfulness meditation emphases metacognitive awareness o f  experience regardless 
o f  its desirability o r relevance. In fact, it is this explicit awareness o f  ongoing mental content, 
called meta-awareness (S c h o o le r e t  a l., 2011) or metacognition (Fleming e t  a l., 2012), that 
allows distracting mental content to be noticed so that attention can subsequently be reoriented  
(S c h o o le r e t  a l., 2011; Sm allw ood, Mcspadden, & S ch o o le r , 2007; Sm allw ood & S ch o o le r ,
2006). Mindfulness, or “attending to the present moment”, can therefore be operationaüzed as 
the metacognitive monitoring o f  the focus o f  attention.
It is well known that mind-wandering often occurs without the awareness that one’s mind has 
drifted (G iambra, 1995; Schooler, 2002). Importantly, recent w ork has show that the tendency 
to mind-wander correlates negatively with a mindful disposition (Mrazek, Smallwood, &  
Schooler, 2012). Furtherm ore, successful outcome after MBCT has been associated with 
increased availability o f  metacognitive reflection on negative experiences (Teasdale et al., 2002). 
Although metacognition is understood to be an important aspect o f  mindfulness, experimental 
evidence for improved metacognitive functioning after mindfulness meditation has been only 
inferred indirectly from  studies showing increased perform ance in tasks requiring cognitive 
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control and response inhibition. Jha and colleagues (2007) found that mindfulness meditation 
improved conflict monitoring in the Attention Network task. Allen and colleagues (2012) showed 
a reduction in affective Stroop conflict and in Heeren and colleagues (2009), mindfulness training 
was associated with increased cognitive inhibition in go/nogo task.
Metacognition has been a traditional topic o f  interest in m em ory research for decades (see 
M e tc a lfe , Shimamura (1994) and D u n losk y  an d  B jo rk  (2008) fo r an overview). Recently, 
metacognition o f  action and perceptual processes have become a topic o f  interest as well (see 
Flem ing e t  a l . (2012) fo r an overview). Since mindfulness meditation is first and forem ost an 
attentional practice, recent w ork on metacognition o f attention, o r conversely o f  mind-wandering, 
could be a promising direction o f  neuroscientific research. Previous experiments on metacognition 
o f  attention or mind-wandering have used control tasks or external stimulation (Braboszcz 
& D elorm e, 2011; C h ris to ff  e t  a l., 2009; M acd on a ld  e t  a l .,  2011; W n.TM7.TG e t  a l .,  2008). 
W hen studying neural correlates o f  attention during meditation, however, the perform ance o f  a 
concom itant task can be expected to interfere with attentional monitoring, as well as preventing 
ecologically valid conclusions regarding meditation. Furtherm ore, task perform ance and stimulus 
processing might provide Information about the attentional state during stimulus processing or 
task perform ance, preventing conclusions in terms o f  metacognition o f  attention p er se (Fleming 
e t  a l., 2012). Im portantly however, the attentional state can be determined without a control task 
or external stimulus. Cortical alpha activity has been shown to reflect both the degree and the 
location o f  covert som atosensory attention (Haegens e t  a l., 2011; H aegens e t  a l., 2012; van  
E de e t  a l .,  2011; van  E de e t  a l., 2010). Furthermore, occipital alpha power was shown to be 
strongly correlated with self-reported attention during a visual detection task (M acdonald  e t  a l., 
2011). In a recent study, we reported that contralateral alpha power corresponds to self-reported  
attentional focus as well (W hitm arsh, e t  a l., 2013). In this study we used an identical paradigm 
as in W hitm arsh et al. (2013) to investigate w hether metacognitive awareness o f  attention is 
improved after extensive mindfulness meditation.
Participants were presented with auditory cues to attend either to their left or right hand while their 
brain activity was measured using MEG. After a random time interval trials were terminated with 
a probe sound to which they reported the degree of attentional focus. Self-reported attentional 
focus was compared with contralateral somatosensory alpha preceding probe onset, in eleven 
one second intervals. We compared the degree of correspondence over time between novice 
and expert mindfulness meditators as well as with that previously reported for meditation-naive 
participants (Whitmarsh et al., 2013). We predicted that meditators would show a stronger and 
more sustained correspondence between self-reported attentional focus and contralateral alpha 
power over time. Furthermore, we expected these differences to be more pronounced for expert 
meditators compared to novices.
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Methods
Participants
The control group consisted of fifteen healthy participants (9 female, mean 29.4years, SD = 10.4). 
One control participant was excluded from the analysis due to excessive movement artifacts. The 
meditation group consisted of sixteen healthy experienced mindfulness meditators (5 female, 
mean 48.0 years, SD = 16.1). They were recruited via personal network of mindfulness teachers or 
contacted direcdy. To be included in our study they had to be familiar with mindfulness meditation 
through a meditation retreat and had to practice mindfulness mediation regularly for at least a 
year at the time of the study. Participants were enrolled after providing written informed consent 
and were paid in accordance with guidelines of the local ethics committee (CMO Committee 
on Research Involving Humans subjects, region Arnhem-Nijmegen, the Netherlands). The 
experiment was in compliance with national legislation as well as the code of ethical principles 
(Declaration of Helsinki).
Procedure
Participants were instructed to attend continuously to the cued hand while remaining aware of 
their attentive state until a probe sound (2000Hz tone) was presented (Figure IA). Cues consisted 
of two sequential tones of 400ms each, 200ms apart, either ascending in pitch for the right hand 
(2000Hz followed by 2500Hz) or descending for the left hand (2000Hz followed by 1500Hz). 
Cue side was determined pseudo-randomly. The subjective evaluation of attention was done 
by button press, selecting one out of four options: (1) not at all, (2) little, (3) much, (4) fully/ 
maximally attentive. To minimize head movements and provide more comfort participants were 
measured in supine position. To minimize eye movements and blinks and increase the chance 
of fluctuations in attentional focus, participants were instructed to remain with their eyes closed 
throughout the experiment.
The experiment started with a training session until participants were familiar with the paradigm, 
followed by three continuous experimental blocks of 125 trials (~25 minutes each) separated by 
self-paced breaks. Non-evaluation trials (10% ad randoni) were indicated by the presentation of an 
extra third cue of similar pitch to the second. Participants were instructed that no evaluation of 
attention was needed at these trials, but to respond as quickly as possible with their index finger. 
On these trials only, participants received a short electrical stimulation of the cued hand after 
probe offset, to provide an additional functional localizer (which was not used in the analysis). 
Non-evaluation trials were discarded from all further analysis. Cue-probe intervals were generated 
according to an exponential distribution with mean of 3 seconds and a cut-off time of 27 seconds, 
providing a flat hazard rate. In other words, the chance of the probe occurring after trial onset
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was held constant. A minimal cue-probe interval of 5 seconds was added, resulting in an average 
cue-probe interval of 8 seconds, and maximal of 32 seconds.
1 trials 294
Figure 1. Schematic of paradigm and example of the design matrix used for the source level General 
Linear Model. A) Schematic depiction of paradigm showing timing parameters of trial. B) Example design 
matrix showing regressors for conditions (O’s and I ’s) and confound regressors (normalized).
Data Preprocessing
Continuous M E G  data was recorded using a 275-sensor axial gradiom eter system (CTF M EG  
TM Systems Inc., Port Coquitlam, BC, Canajda) placed in a magnetically shielded room. The 
ongoing M E G  signals were low-pass fïltered at 300  Hz, digitized at 12 00  Hz, and stored fo r off- 
line analysis. The subjects’ head position was continuously recorded relative to the gradiometer 
array using coils positioned at the subject’s nasion and at the le ft and right ear canals. High- 
resolution anatomical images (1 mm isotropic voxel size) were acquired using a 1.5-T  Siemens 
Magnetom Sonata system (Erlangen, G ermany). The same earplugs, using vitamin E instead o f 
the coils, were used fo r co-registration w ith the M E G  data.
Data Analysis
MEG data was analyzed using the Matlab-based Fieldtrip toolbox, developed at the Donders 
Institute for Brain, Cognition and Behavior (Oostenveld et al., 2 011). Trials containing 
movement, muscle, and superconducting quantum interference device (SQUID) jumps were 
discarded by visual inspection. Independent component analysis (ICA) was used to remove eye 
and heart artifacts.
Source Reconstruction
Source reconstruction was performed using a frequency-domain beamformer approach 
(Dynamic Imaging of Coherent Sources) which uses adaptive spatial filters to localize power
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in the entire brain (G ross et al., 2001; Liljestrom et al., 2005). The brain volume of each 
individual subject was discretized to a grid with a 0.8-cm resolution. For every grid point a spatial 
filter was constructed from the cross-spectral density matrix and the lead field. The lead fields 
were calculated from a subject specific realistic single-shell model of the brain (Nolte, 2003), 
based on the individual anatomical MRIs. We calculated the cross-spectral density matrix based 
upon the full interval between cue offset and probe onset to obtain the most accurate estimation 
of the alpha sources. Individual alpha frequencies were used, determined by the maximum log 
power between 7 and 15 Hz on all trials and sensors.
Separate analyses were performed for one second segments preceding probe onset, to a maximum 
of 11 seconds before probe onset. A sufficiënt number of trials (—100) had trial lengths of at 
least 11 seconds to enable source statistics at those intervals. After calculating the spatial filter 
for each grid point and one-second time segment, alpha activity was estimated using a (Slepian) 
multitaper approach to accomplish accurate frequency smoothing for the alpha band (+ 2 Hz) 
around the subject-specific alpha peaks. To enable valid voxel-by-voxel comparisons in the face 
of the beamformer depth bias, alpha estimates were standardized over trials.
A voxel-by-voxel ftrst-level GLM approach was then used fo r every subject and time segment. 
Figure 1B shows an example design matrix, including cue side (left/right) and self-report (high/ 
low), dichotomized according to a median split per subject and time-point. In addition, trial 
number as well as the mean X, Y  and Z position o f  the three fiducial coils were entered as separate 
regressors. The locations o f  the fiducial coils indicate the position o f  anatomical landmarks o f  
the subject’s head (nasion and pre-auricular points) in the MEG helmet. By including the average 
fiducial positions during each trial, variance that was caused by differences in head position 
over trials was also reduced. To further reduce variance that could be explained by response 
preparation, regressors fo r evaluation response times and cue-probe duration were added to the 
GLM, together with separate regressors fo r the response hand, which was switched between each 
block and randomized over subjects. The cue side and self-report predictors consisted o f  O’s and 
I ’s, thereby yielding mean standardized alpha power after multiplication with the standardized 
data. By standardizing the remaining covariates (response time, trial length, fiducial position, etc) 
multiplication with the standardized data resulted in correlation values (r). Prior to averaging and 
group statistics, the resulting beta-values and correlations values were spatially normalized using 
SPM 2 to the International Consortium for Brain Mapping template (Montreal N eurological 
Institute, MNI, M ontreal, QC, Canada).
Functional localization of somatosensory regions
After the reconstruction of alpha power for each voxel and time-point, somatosensory regions 
of interest (ROIs) were determined based on alpha power during the last second preceding probe
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onset. A voxel-by-voxel comparison was made between left and right attention trials. A cluster- 
based permutation test (Maris & Oostenveld, 2007) was then used to identify significant spatial 
clusters. This resulted in a distinct somatosensory alpha-ROI for each hemisphere. Each ROI 
therefore depended on cue condition (left versus right), but remained independent of the self- 
reported evaluation of attention.
Region of Interest analysis
Alpha power values within the left and right ROI voxels were averaged according to cue condition 
(ipsi versus contra), evaluation (high versus low) and time-point (eleven one-second intervals 
preceding probe onset). The effects of cue condition and evaluation on mean alpha power were 
tested over time using repeated measures ANOVA. Differences in these effects over time were 
tested using post-hoc t-tests per time-point.
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Results
Attentional focus fluctuated over trials, as was reflected by the use of the full range of responses 
(Figure 2A). Participants were generally confident about their ability to perform the task, as was 
shown by the large fraction of high evaluations. A repeated measures ANOVA with one within- 
subject factor with four levels (evaluation) and one group factor (meditators vs. Controls) showed 
that the number of trials per level of attention were significandy different (F(3) = 30.931, p < 
0.001), and assumed a negative linear relationship (F(l) = 73.889, p = <0.001). No effect of 
group on evaluation was found (F(3) = 1.451, p = .234). Evaluation times were also significandy 
different between levels of attention (F(3) = 55.390, p < 0.001) and showed a positive linear 
relationship (F(l) = 69.862, p < 0.001). No effect of group on evaluation time was found (F(3) = 
2.038, p = .116). Furthermore, evaluation times correlated negatively with cue-probe duration for 
both Controls (mean r = -0.130, t(13) = -5.505, p  = < 0.001) and meditators (mean r = -0.078, 
t(15) = -2.648, p = 0.018), showing that longer cue-probe durations did not result in a loss of 
vigilance. The correlation between evaluation times and cue-probe duration did not differ between 
the groups (t(28) = -1.3450, p = 0.189). The behavioral analysis therefore showed no differences 
between meditators and Controls, and both groups were confident in their performance of the 
task.
.33 100
high 0 - -0  low high <J- ->■ low
evaluation of attention evaluation of attention
Figure 2. Behavioral differences between evaluations. A Distribution of number of trials per evaluation 
of attention show that attention was generally rated high, showing a negative relationship with level of 
attention. B Evaluation times were reduced when attention was evaluated higher, showing a positive 
relationship with level of attention. No differences between groups were found.
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Regions of interest analysis
Somatosensory alpha regions of interest (ROIs) were determined for Controls and meditators on 
the basis of the lateralization of alpha power (alpha cue left minus alpha cue right) during the last 
second before probe onset. A cluster-based permutation test (M a r is  &  O o s te n v e ld , 2007) was 
used to identify the significant clusters responsive to cue direction. In both groups the analysis 
resulted in two significant clusters, one in each hemisphere, including primary sensorimotor areas 
(see Figure 3). A cluster-based permutation test of alpha lateralization showed no significant 
differences between groups. Mean values of alpha power within the group-specific regions-of- 
interest were used in further analysis. We then computed contralateral alpha power preceding 
probe onset. Evaluations were dichotomized according to a median split per subject and time- 
point, resulting in time courses for high versus low attention trials (Figure 4).
CONTROLS MEDITATORS
Figure 3. Somatosensory alpha power lateralized in response to cue direction in both groups. Source 
reconstructed alpha activity during one second preceding probe-onset shows clear lateralization in areas 
including primary somatosensory regions. Significant voxels were thresholded based on cluster-based 
permutation test (p< 0.05) (M a m s  &  O osten veld ,  2007).
Controls versus meditators
We performed a repeated measures ANOVA with time and self-report (high vs. low) as within- 
subject factors and group (meditators vs. Controls) as a between-subjects factor. Self-report 
showed a significant effect on contralateral alpha power (F(l,28) = 9.509, p = 0.005). Time 
showed to be a significant factor as well (F(10,19) = 2.983, p = 0.019). No significant interaction 
with group or between time and self-report effects were found. As expected, no effect of self- 
report was found for the ipsilateral ROI (F(l,28) = 2.318, p = 0.139). We took a closer look at 
the temporal profile of alpha in the high versus low evaluated trials. In Controls, the last three
85
CHAPTER 5. Mindfulness meditation enables proactive metacognition o f  attention
second interval before probe onset showed significantly lower alpha power in high versus low 
attention trials (Figure 4A; paired t-tests, two-tailed: [-3:-2], t(13) = -2.357, p = 0.036; [-2:-l], t(13) 
= -2.746, 0.017; [-1:0], t(13) = -2.648, p = 0.020). Although the full model ANOVA did not show 
a significant interaction between time and group, differences in alpha power preceded those of 
Controls (paired t-tests, two-tailed: [-10:-9], t ( l5) = -2.806, p = 0.04; f-6:-5], t(15) = -2.156, p = 
0.048; [-5:-4] t(15) = -4.413, p < 0.001; [-4:-3], t(15) = -2.275, p = 0.036). As predicted, no time 
points showed a difference between high and low attention on the ipsilateral ROI, for either the 
control group or the meditation group.
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Figure 4. Time-resolved analysis of contralateral alpha power for Controls (A) and meditators (B). Asterisk 
depict significant differences between high- and low-attention at individual time points. Shaded surface
represents Standard error of mean.
Differences between high and low attention trials were shown to be uncorrelated with age at any 
of the significant time points for either Controls ( [-3:-2], r = -.31, p = .915; [-2:-l], r = -.016, p 
= .956; [-1:0], r = .313, p = .275) or meditators: ([-10:-9], r = -.912, p = .476; [-6:-5], r = .096, p = 
.724; [-5:-4], r = -.191, p = .478; [-4:-3], r = .188, p = .486).
Novice versus expert meditators
To explore differences between novices and expert meditators we applied a median split of the 
meditation group on the basis of total hours of meditation experience. Hours of meditation 
experience were calculated from the self-reported estimated time spend in meditation per week, 
multiplied by the total duration of consistent meditation practice. For meditation retreats an
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estimated ten hours per day were added. The median split resulted in two very separate groups 
for novices (n = 7, mean = 555 hrs, range 220-885 hrs) and expert meditators (n = 8, mean 12962 
hrs, range 3275-24819 hrs). One meditator did not reply to our follow-up questions and could 
not be included in the analysis.
As can be seen in Figure 5A, the temporal profile of the novice meditators showed a remarkable 
similarity with those of Controls, showing a significant effect of self-report at a distinct period 
direcdy preceding probe onset ([-2:-l] t(6) = -4.057, p = .006; [-5:-4] t(6) = -2.298, p = .062; [-6:- 
5] t(6) = -3.865, p = 0.008). Expert meditators, however, showed a dramatically different profile 
(Figure 5B), with significant differences in alpha power preceding the differences found in novices 
([-10:-9] t(7) = -2.391, p = 0.048; [-8:-7] t(7) = -2.201, p = 0.064 (trend)-, [-7:-6] t(7) = -2.008, p = 
0.085 (trend)- f-5:-6] t(7) = -2.580, p = 0.036; [-5:-4] t(7) = -3.769, p = 0.008). Furthermore, the 
last interval in high meditators showed a significant difference in the opposite direction after what 
seems to be a gradual reduction of alpha power in low attention trials during the last seconds 
of the trial (t(7) = 3.593, p = 0.009). We therefore divided the temporal profile midway in time 
and averaged alpha power for high and low self-report within the late and early period preceding 
probe onset. An ANOVA with self-report (high vs. low) and time (early vs. late) as within-subjects 
factors and group (novice vs. expert) as between-subjects factor showed a significant main effect 
of self-report (F(l,13) = 7.672, p = 0.016) as well as significant interaction between self-report, 
time and group (F(l,13) = 8.908, p = 0.011).
A NOVICES B EXPERTS
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Figure 5. Time-resolved analysis of contralateral alpha power for novice meditators (A) and expert 
meditators (B). Asterisk depict significant differences between high- and low-attention at individual time 
points. Shaded surface represents Standard error of mean.
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Discussion
Compared to both meditation-naive Controls and novice meditators, expert mindfulness 
meditators showed a distincdy different temporal profile of metacognitive awareness. While 
the self-reported attentional state of Controls and novices were reflected by differences in alpha 
power preceding probe-onset, expert meditators showed a correspondence between self-report 
and alpha power during an extended period of time preceding that of both Controls and novice 
meditators. Furthermore, expert meditators displayed a pronounced suppression of contralateral 
alpha power before probe onset, even surpassing those of high attention trials. Both these results 
are unexpected and warrant only tentative conclusions. Given these reservations, the results 
suggest shed light on previously unexplored territory and suggest new avenues of exploring 
neurocognitive mechanisms of mindfulness meditation. Firstly, the findings suggest that while 
novice meditators and Controls were able to report on their attentional state retrospectively (i.e. 
after probe onset), expert meditators monitored their attention continuously and used it proactively 
rather than reactively. The ability maintain moment-by-moment evaluation of attention is in 
accordance with the proposed aim of mindfulness meditation. This might have enabled expert 
meditators to reestablish their attentional focus when distraction was noticed, as reflected by the 
suppression of alpha power in the latter half of low attention trials. However, since these trials 
were still reported as low attention trials, expert meditators might have confounded metacognitive 
awareness of their attentional state with that of attentional control. Future research could test 
this hypothesis by using additional self-report probes of both attentional state as well as effort/ 
control. Positive findings on both indexes would provide objective evidence for the claim that 
mindfulness meditation increases the ability to differentiate internal cognitive processes (B is h o p  
e t  a l . ,  2004).
Alpha values for each voxel and time interval were standardized over all trials to remove the 
beamformer depth bias. Because we were interested in the correspondence between self-reports 
and alpha power over time, our data was standardized per time-interval as well. This made our 
paradigm particularly sensitive to metacognitive awareness of attention, but might have missed 
other effect of mindfulness meditation such as an increased ability to modulate somatosensory 
alpha ( K e r r  e t  a l . ,  2011). Our findings are, however, in line with recent studies reporting 
improvements in attentional stability ( L u t z  e t  a l . ,  2009b) and improved conflict monitoring ( J h a  
e t  a l . ,  2007) as both are considered to be under metacognitive control ( F le m in g  e t  a l . ,  2012).
The experiment required a minimum of behavioral responses, and these were not experienced 
as interfering with the usual practice of mindfulness meditation. In fact, the paradigm was well 
received by the expert meditators we measured. The benefit of a less intrusive paradigm in 
meditation research cannot be overstated. The absence of any external stimuli or behavioral
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measurements too often precludes unequivocal interpretation of psychophysical findings (see 
e.g. C a h n  a n d  P o x jc h , 2006), while at the same time, exogenous perceptual and behavioral tasks 
might interfere with the introspective practice.
A possible limitation to our study is the fact that the meditation and control groups were not 
matched in age, with the meditation group being significantly older. However, for both Controls 
and meditators, age did not correlate with the differences in alpha power between high and low 
attention trials. It is therefore highly unlikely that results were dependent on age. As a between- 
subjects cross-sectional study our results might also suffer from a selection bias. The fact that 
our findings depended on the hours of meditation experience speaks against an interpretation 
in terms of differences preceding their meditation practice. Lastly, we cannot exclude any ‘third 
variable’ that might correlate both with meditation experience as well as metacognitive ability. For 
instance, it is shown that metacognition is impaired under conditions such as cigarette craving 
(S a y e t t e , S c h o o l e r , &  R e ic h l e , 2010) or inebriation (S a y e t t e , R e ic h l e , &  S c h o o l e r , 2009). 
Since meditation is often practiced in a social and religious context, it cannot be excluded that 
influences of life-style might have played a role.
Mindfulness meditation has been theorized to distinguish itself from meditation practices that 
focus on sustained and selective attention through its emphasis on metacognitive monitoring (L u t z  
e t  a l ., 2006; L u t z  e t  a l ., 2008). While there is growing evidence that mindfulness meditation 
improves attentional abilities, convincing evidence for improved ability for metacognitive 
monitoring has been lacking (C h ie sa  e t  a l ., 2011). This is unfortunate, since these metacognitive 
abilities are proposed to underlie its clinical efficacy (B a e r , 2003 and T e a sd a l e  e t  a l ., 2002). Our 
findings therefore provide important preliminary evidence for the involvement of metacognitive 
monitoring in mindfulness meditation. Furthermore, our results suggest that such proactive 
attentional monitoring abilities could improve the ability to manage attentional resources on a 
moment-by-moment basis. However, in line with the conclusion of Chiesa and colleagues (2011), 
our results also show that measurable effects might require extensive practice.
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General discussion
Abstract
The aim of this thesis was to investigate neural and behavioral correlates of mindful traits and 
mindfulness practice (meditation). We pursued these research questions from two perspectives 
that have received limited attention in experimental studies of mindfulness, while at the same time 
being theorized to be its defïning characteristics. Nonreactivity was conceived as the disposition 
or ability to respond less automatically to thoughts and feelings, while metacognitive awareness was 
operationalized as the ability to observe and report upon mental content and cognitive process. 
We will first summarize the preceding empirical chapters and interpret their results in terms of 
the model offered in the introduction. We will then discuss a possible convergence between 
metacognitive monitoring and nonreactivity.
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Summary of findings
Second chapter
In the second chapter we began our search for a physiological marker of (non)reactivity by 
investigating the automatic somatosensory response to the observation of pain. Using MEG 
we showed that observing painful stimuli results in a suppression of alpha power at primary 
somatosensory regions, representing an automatic disinhibition o f the somatosensory cortex. 
These findings can be seen as reflecting attentional processes underlying the perception- 
action account of empathy: “The attended perception of the object’s state automatically 
activates the subject’s representation of the state, situation, and object, and the activation of 
these representations automatically primes or generates the associated autonomie and somatic 
responses, unless inhibited” (Preston & de W aal, 2002).
However, the effect on somatosensory alpha suppression did not correlate with the Interpersonal 
Reactivity Index (Davis, 1983), nor with the Factor Mindfulness Questionnaire, (Baer et al., 
2006, unreported). So although we were able to report a measure o f reactivity, this measurement 
did not correlate with trait measures o f (non)reactivity considered to be important for the mindful 
trait. Although somewhat unexpected at the time, in hindsight these results were consistent with 
the model we proposed in the introduction. They indicate that the mindfulness trait refers to 
our habitual or skilful responses to affective experiences, but not necessarily to the processing 
o f the sensory experience. In other words, the results we obtained from our first study reflects 
early sensory and attentional responses to an aversive stimulus that precedes possible effects o f 
mindful attitudes and traits. The differences in reactivity that are observed between individuals 
in mindfulness research might therefore correspond more to subsequent affective and cognitive 
processes. One brain region that is central to affective processing is the amygdala (Davis & 
W halen, 2001; Pessoa, 2008; Phelps, 2006). Amygdala responses to emotional stimuli have been 
shown to differ across individuals according to their personality traits (Davidson, 1998; Davidson
& Irwin, 1999; Lapate et al., 2012). In addition, reactivity to negative emotional stimuli o f the 
medial prefrontal cortex also correlates with neuroticism (Haas & Canli, 2008). Neuroticism 
is a trait that is characterized by negative mood states, sensitivity to negative information and 
negative appraisal; and importandy, has been shown to correlate negatively with the FFMQ 
(Baer et al., 2006). Effects o f  mindfulness meditation training on the amygdala have also been 
observed. In a longitudinal study, Goldin & Gross (2010) reported that after 8 weeks o f  MBSR 
training, social anxiety patients exhibited a faster return to baseline in right amygdala activity while 
viewing phrases o f negative self-beliefs. Similarly, in a control group study by Desbordes et al. 
(2012), MBSR resulted in reduced amygdala activity when viewing emotional pictures. After only 
1 week o f practice, the amygdala response to emotional images was shown to be down-regulated
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when in a “mindful” meditative state, compared to a non-meditation baseline (T a y l o r  e t  a l ., 
2011). Interestingly, in the same study, highly experienced meditators did not reduce amygdala 
activity but instead deactivated medial prefrontal and posterior cingulate cortices. According to 
the authors, this discrepancy is consistent with an effect of mindfulness meditation on cognitive 
process that occur after the initial response, i.e. through a reduction of cognitive elaboration and 
judgments. From this perspective, mindfulness targets cognitive processes related to acceptance, 
interpretation and evaluation of emotional responses rather than voluntary or automatic emotional 
inhibition or modulation. Such an interpretation is in line with our observation of an absence of 
correlations between somatosensory reactivity and trait measures of reactivity.
Taken together, our investigation of sensory reactivity revealed that trait measures of (non) 
reactivity might be reflected by higher-order cognition, more frontal brain-regions and more 
complex behavioral tasks rather than initial sensory, affective or attentional responses.
Third chapter
Our brain is exceptionally able to piek up complex regularities in our environment, and it does so 
generally without our conscious intention or awareness. In fact, implicit knowledge underlies much 
of our skilled behavior - from knowing how to ride a bicycle, to our ability to appreciate music 
and to communicate by using language (Stadler & Frensch, 1998). This knowledge is typically 
not consciously accessible in the form of facts (knowing that) but rather expresses itself through 
our actions (knowing how). Once learned, implicit knowledge is hard to inhibit, as it expresses 
itself as a habit. Take for instance the classic Stroop task (Stroop, 1935) in which one is instructed 
to read out aloud the color of the word, but not the word itself. People are much faster when 
the word and the color are congruent, e.g. with RED, than when they are incongruent, e.g. 
with GREEN. This is one example of how our ability to read has become a habitual response 
to implicit knowledge. For the purpose of investigating the (non)reactive mindfulness trait, we 
measured the correlation between the tendency to respond habitually to implicit knowledge and 
mindfulness traits as measured by the FFMQ.
We used the artificial grammar learning paradigm (AGL) to induce implicit learning under 
controlled conditions. For five days participants were unknowingly exposed to a set of symbol 
sequences generated from a formal grammar (a complex rule system) in the form of a short- 
term memory task. Participants gradually preferred those sequences that were congruent with 
the grammar over those that violated the grammar. However, we showed that more mindful 
individuals expressed less sensitivity to the unconsciously learned regularities. In other words, 
when more mindful participants were asked to respond on the basis of their “gut feeling”, their 
responses corresponded less to the grammatical status of the sequences they had acquired. This 
effect was independent of differences in effort, working (verbal) memory or linguistic abilitics.
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These findings therefore indicated that a more mindful trait corresponds to a smaller tendency to 
respond habitually to implicit representations. Furthermore, this effect was expressed strongest 
for the non-judgmental and non-reactive subscales of the FFMQ.
These findings provide novel evidence for the nonreactive mindfulness trait. They suggest 
that more mindful individuals are less under the sway of unconscious representations (that 
underlie much of our habitual actions). Since such a nonreactive disposition can be trained 
within a mindfulness program (C a r m o d y  &  B a e r , 2008 a n d  K u y k e n  e t  a l ., 2010 & 2012), such 
training could help individuals better manage clinical problems that are caused by destructive 
but persevering behavioral patterns. In other words, these findings suggest that a mindful 
disposition could free individuals from responding habitually and affirmatively to unconscious 
representations or memories. Although the influence of implicit knowledge in our experiment 
could be considered weak or even inconsequential compared to implicit representations that 
might underly the symptoms of e.g. depressed patients, as a general principle, a mindful trait 
might have salutary effects on both clinical and non-clinical problems.
A limitation of our study was that it did not measure acquisition of implicit knowledge separately 
from its effect on behavior. Our results could therefore be explained by a reduced acquisition 
of implicit representations rather than a reduced reactivity. While control analysis suggested 
otherwise, it remains to be tested whether a mindful disposition could impair the ability to learn 
and performproductive habitual skills. It has to be pointed out here that in our task the acquisition 
occurred implicidy. In other words, participants were not aware of the fact that they were learning 
a grammatical regularity and that they would be asked to use this knowledge later. Our results 
therefore do not generalize to situations wherein one is consciously (explicidy) engaged in learning 
or remembering. In these cases an interaction between the mindfulness trait and learning could 
be of a dramatically different nature. A nonreactive disposition towards internal representations 
might, in fact, help reduce interference from those habits that are nonproductive or inefficient 
fo r  the task at hand. This hypothesis could be tested using a learning task that provides trail-by- 
trial feedback or in which the learning goal is made explicit. Interestingly, some evidence for a 
positive influence of mindfulness on reducing dysfunctional representations comes from recent 
studies that show that specificity in autobiographical memory increases in healthy and formerly 
depressed people after MBCT (H a r g u s  e t  a l ., 2010; H e e r e n  e t  a l ., 2009; W il l ia m s  e t  a l . , 2000). 
Taken together, we believe that our results provide evidence for a nonreactive mindfulness trait 
on the response level rather than during encoding, providing cues to a potential mechanism for 
its salutary effects.
Fourth chapter
We then proceeded to study the second aspect of mindfulness we introduced, namely 
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metacognitive monitoring. Specifically, we investigated whether the degree of somatosensory 
attentional focus is metacognitively accessible on a moment-by-moment basis. For this purpose 
we indexed the attentional focus through measurements of contralateral somatosensory alpha 
power (magnetoencephalography, MEG). Participants were cued to direct their attention to either 
their left or right hand. At unpredictable moment the trials were terminated with a probe sound. 
Participants had to report about their attention focus at the moment of the probe. Self-reported 
attentional focus was shown to correspond with their somatosensory alpha power preceding 
probe onset. Furthermore, self-reports were shown to be based on attentional focus rather than 
on a general attentional state (e.g. vigilance) because the correspondence between alpha power 
and self-reports only occurred for the contralateral but not for the ipsilateral hemisphere. This 
study therefore provides strong support for the metacognitive accessibility of attentional focus. 
Moreover, this is the first study showing metacognition in the absence of either exogenous 
stimulation or evaluations of task performance based on overt behavior. This provides us with 
a measure of metacognitive awareness of attention that is ideally suited to simulate the minimal 
sensory and behavioral context in which mindfulness meditation is commonly practiced.
Fifth chapter
In the fifth chapter we investigated whether meditation experience could be associated with an 
improved ability for metacognitive monitoring. Using the paradigm we developed in the previous 
chapter, we replicated our findings in a group o f mindfulness meditators, showing the robustness 
o f the paradigm and our initial findings in Controls. In this study we extended the analysis o f  
brain activity to include eleven seconds before probe onset. Differences between the meditators 
and Controls manifested as different temporal profiles rather than differences in average alpha 
power. Whereas in Controls self-reported attention corresponded to differences in alpha power 
during the last three seconds preceding probe onset, self-reports by meditators were reflected 
by alpha power differences preceding those o f Controls. Importantly, a median split between 
novice (<1000hrs) and expert meditators (>>1000hrs) showed that this difference only occurred 
in expert meditators, while novice meditators showed a profile remarkably similar to that o f 
Controls.
Unexpectedly, expert meditators showed a pronounced suppression of contralateral alpha power 
preceding probe onset for those trials that were identified as low attention trials. These findings 
suggested that once expert meditators observed their attention faltering, they corrected their 
contralateral alpha level back (and beyond) those of good trials. These corrected trials were still 
reported as low attention trials, suggesting that the refocusing of attention was identified as 
corresponding to a suboptimal (low attention) trial. This suggests that expert meditators were able 
to distinguish their momentary attentional state as well as their attentional control. This would be in
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line with the hypothesis formulated by Bishop and colleagues (2004) that mindfulness meditation 
might increase cognitive complexity, permitting finer discriminations of sensory, affective and 
mental states. Future research could further explore this interesting proposal through the use 
of additional self-reports such as perceived effort, difficulty and confidence. Importantly, future 
research should investigate whether the differences that were found between expert and novice 
meditators resulted from changes in metacognitive ability, rather than differences in the execution 
of the instruction, i.e. if  the expert meditators reported their attentional effort rather than 
their attentional state. Interestingly, in expert meditators the earlier part of the trial displayed a 
sustained correspondence between alpha levels and self-reported attention. These results were 
unexpected as well, and only the most tentative conclusion are warranted at this point. They do 
suggest that expert meditators were continuously monitoring their attentional state, enabling the 
aforementioned compensatory adjustment to their attentional state. Since Controls and novice 
meditators showed neither a correspondence between self-report and alpha in the early phase, 
nor the compensatory alpha suppression in the later phase, we suggest that novices and Controls 
might have been evaluating their attention retrospectively instead, i.e. after the probe, whereas the 
expierence of expert meditators allowed more proactive monitoring.
Together, although tentative, these results provide a novel view on the metacognitive processes 
during mindfulness meditation, as well as into the potential long-term effects of its practice. 
Importandy, the possible increased ability of expert mindfulness meditators to continuously monitor 
their attentional focus could be considered preliminary empirical support for the theoretic model 
put forward by Lutz et al. (Lutz et al., 2006). In their taxonomy of meditation practices, Focused 
Attention refers to those practices that revolve around sustaining selective attention, while in 
mindfulness metacognitive monitoring of experience is emphasized. Furthermore, the fact that the 
differences were only shown by expert and not novice meditators, substantiates the suggestion by 
Chiesa aand colleagues (2011) that improvements in metacognitive functioning might only occur 
after extensive mindfulness meditation practice.
Metacognitive monitoring and nonreactivity converging?
In this thesis we have argued that nonreactivity and metacognitive monitoring are of crucial 
importance for understanding mindfulness meditation - from its historical to its contemporary 
practice - as well as the mechanisms underlying its purported clinical and nonclinical benefits. 
The question we should pose now, however, is how these two aspects of mindfulness meditation 
might be related.
Although we have focused on nonreactivity, this is only one of a number of skilful responses to 
emotional or distracting experiences (box E) that comprise the set of mindful attitudes (Figure 1,
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box C). As we already mentioned in the introduction, the first three factors of the FFMQ (observing, 
describing and acting with awareness, Box F) reflect aspects of metacognitive monitoring, while the 
last two (nonjudging and nonreactivity, Box C & D) reflect mindful attitudes or traits that refer to the 
cognitive and affective response to experience (Box E). In our model we have separated these 
processes. However, by using a bidirectional arrow we do suggest that mindful attitudes not only 
affect metacognitive monitoring but that the reverse is likely true as well. How this could be the 
case is an important research question that has remained unaddressed in questionnaire research. 
Similarly, while Bishop and colleagues (2004) defined mindfulness in terms of these two aspects, 
they did not address the nature of their interrelationship. While the research reported in this 
thesis does not directly address this question, we allow ourselved to make this interaction explicit 
and propose ways by which it could be considered in future research.
As we extensively argued in the introduction, we consider mindfulness meditation as a metacognitive 
investigation o f experience, enabled by the application o f attitudes that are conducive to this 
investigation. In fact, often the attitudes that we bring to experiences are the problem. Identifying 
these attitudes and engaging in more beneficial ones are part and parcel o f the mindfulness 
meditation practice. These unproductive attitudes are identified as the “hindrances” or “obstacles” 
in both traditional (Gunaratana, 1993) and contemporary clinical practice (Kabat-Zinn, 1990b), 
comprising states o f desire, aversion, sleepiness, restlessness or doubt. Jon Kabat-Zinn, founder 
o f the MBSR, describes that the appropriate response to counteract the distraction and loss 
o f awareness that results from these attitudes, is to adopt an attitude o f non-judging, patience, 
curiosity, trust, non-striving, acceptance and non-attachment. Interestingly, there is some direct 
experimental evidence for an effect o f mental states on the ability for metacognitive monitoring, 
as the latter is shown to be impaired under conditions such as cigarette craving (Sayette et al., 
2010) and inebriation (Sayette et al., 2009). Similarly, mind-wandering is shown to be increased 
by states o f anxiety (Smallwood & Schooler, 2006). Although as o f yet untested, we suggest that 
mindful states or attitudes will be beneficial for metacognitive monitoring by inhibiting mental and 
emotional elaboration (i.e. nonjudging) and by reacting less automatically to thoughts and feelings 
(i.e. nonreactivity). However, we also propose that it is only through the ability o f  metacognitive 
monitoring that dysfunctional attitudes can be recognized so that beneficial ones can be engaged.
Conceptual clarity and a precise and coherent terminology should be amongst the guiding 
principles of all future research into mindfulness, for which this thesis provides some initial 
directions. In particular, we propose that the mutually beneficial relationship between mindful 
attitudes and metacognitive monitoring promises to bridge the seeming incommensurability 
between the paradigms of neurocognitive research - with its focus on the cognitive mechanisms 
of mindfulness meditation - and clinical research, which aims to understand and develop mindful 
traits and attitudes.
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Epilogue
Some research fields know what they are studying. Others do not know yet, and therefore spend a 
great deal of time trying to figuring out what they are trying to figure out. Science is the business 
of questioning, and has equipped itself with a large collection of shiny measurement devices, 
saw y statistical techniques and strict methodological procedures. Some of these are inhetited 
from other fields of study, while others are developed by the field itself, in due course. Especially 
the latter helps to establish an experimental paradigm that has its own identity, its own research 
questions, theories and acronyms. However, before you can use all these shiny instruments, you 
first need to know where they should be pointed at. Metaphorically that is, since in psychology 
(the study of the mind) the object of study is not a where, but a whom. The object of study is the 
subject.
More often than not research fields generate their own questions. That’s the great thing about 
Science: its inherent momentum and ability to discover new questions by learning new ways to 
look for them. Sometimes, however, a question is found just laying around. Minding its own 
business, in a way. Or rather, not being minded by other people’s business. It can lay there for 
quite a while not being noticed, until by some insight or inspiration someone does. Once noticed, 
people start to question what it’s doing there, if  it’s been there for long, where it came from, and 
most importantly: if  it’s going to leave by itself. Sooner or later people will start argueing that 
somebodj needs to do something about it: “We can’t have questions just laying around. It makes us 
all look rather, w ell... unprofessional.”
Some questions attract more attention than others9. A question wouldn’t be noticed at all, of 
course, if  it didn’t. And if it didn’t before, it’s because people didn’t notice it before. The point 
is that once people do notice it, it inevitably starts attracting even more attention. The more 
people that start pointing at it, the more it gains attention, drawing in more attention, until the
9 Many books are written about his rather unsettling issue. In fact, some have argued these books raise even more questions,
and that one should’ve written a book with answers in them instead, of which they, by change, have one “right here”. In turn, even 
more books have been written about these books, starting the whole business anew and leaving everyone a bit angry.
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situation becomes critical. Soon afterwards, questions are typically carried away by the experts. 
They wrap their arms protectively around it and, while mumbling apologies and explanations 
under their breath, jostle it out of the crowd. Sometimes, when the experts are not forthcoming, 
or if the question has become rather popular the crowd was waiting for then, the very people 
that found it might decide to carry it home instead, starting a new field of study themselves. They 
might name it for the person who saw the question first. Far more importantly, however, is to 
decide on a name for the question. This is typically done with much haste so to make sure they 
know what they are talking about. As such things go, choosing a name is not unknown to cause 
considerable discussions amongst the new members. It might even result in questions being called 
by different names by different people, or by the question being abandoned altogether. Although 
this is generally considered to be a bad thing for all those involved, it is also generally considered 
to be caused by the question, rather than by those trying to answer it.
It is a sad thing when questions finally leave us. Their caretakers are never quite the same. Sometimes 
they might even say thej killed it, often with a kind of melancholie pride. According to some 
books, however, questions never really die. Instead, they became a part of all other questions, or 
of an even bigger question, if you like. Some say all questions will someday inevitably come back, 
but only if they were true questions.
This thesis was about a question that’s been around. It had many names, although it is not in its 
nature to remember the past. It is in its nature to feel young and be free. It is in its nature to be 
found and then forgotten.
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Nederlandse Samenvatting
In dit proefschrift hebben we de neurale mechanismen en gedragscorrelaten van mindfulness 
onderzocht. Wat mindfulness precies is, is echter lastig vast te stellen. Mindfulness wordt onder 
andere beschreven als een verzameling cognitieve functies, als een persoonlijkheidstrek, of als een 
specifieke verzameling vermogens of attitudes. In het eerste hoofdstuk gaven we een overzicht 
van deze verschillende conceptualisaties en poogden ze te integreren in een werkmodel ten behoeve 
van ons eigen en toekomstig onderzoek. We beschreven hoe, vanuit een Boeddhistische oorspong, 
mindfulness zijn weg heeft gevonden naar hedendaagse klinische interventies en experimenteel 
onderzoek. De definitie en operationalisatie van mindfulness bleken nog in de kinderschoenen te 
staan. De meeste kennis over mindfulness kwam namelijk voort uit onderzoek dat verricht was 
binnen de kliniek, waarbij de nadruk lag op uitkomstmaten van klinische interventies en minder op 
de cognitieve mechanismen die daaran ten grondslag zouden kunnen liggen. In combinatie met - 
het dus tot nog toe vrij beperkte - experimenteel neurowetenschappelijk onderzoek, bleken vooral 
twee aspecten voor mindfulness van cruciaal belang: non-reactiviteit en metacognitief monitoren. Met 
non-reactiviteit verwezen we in dit proefschrift naar een dispositie (en vermogen) om verminderd 
automatisch te reageren op gedachten en gevoelens. Metacognitief monitoren verwees naar het 
vermogen om mentale inhoud en processen bewust te observeren en daarop te reflecteren.
In het tweede hoofdstuk begonnen we onze zoektocht naar een fysiologisch correlaat van (non) 
reactiviteit. We onderzochten de automatische reacties van de hersenen op de observatie van 
pijnlijke plaatjes met behulp van de MEG (magnetoencephalografie). We vonden dat tijdens de 
observatie van deze plaatjes bepaalde hersengolven (hersengolven van ongeveer 10 oscillaties 
per seconde, ook wel alfa-golven genoemd) werden onderdrukt in de hersengebieden waarin 
ons eigen lichaam gerepresenteerd wordt. Dat wil zeggen dat onze eigen lichaamsrepresentaties 
automatisch geactiveerd worden wanneer we naar andere mensen in een pijnlijke situatie kijken. 
Deze hersenactiviteit bleek echter geen verband te houden met de scores op vragenlijsten 
waarmee we empathie, individuele reactiviteit of mindfulness maten. Hieruit concludeerden we 
dat non-reactiviteit niet zozeer te maken zou kunnen hebben met het verwerken van emotionele 
informatie, maar meer met onze automatische reactie op deze emotionele informatie.
In het derde hoofdstuk vervolgden we ons onderzoek door ons te richten op de (automatische) 
reacties op emotionele informatie. Onze hypothese was dat personen die hoger scoren op 
een mindfulness vragenlijst zich minder door emotionele processen zouden laten leiden. 
Proefpersonen werd verteld dat ze aan een onderzoek naar geheugen meededen. Daarbij werd 
hen op vijf verschillende gelegenheden gevraagd om honderden letterreeksen een-voor-een te 
onthouden en te reproduceren. De proefpersonen waren zich er echter niet van bewust dat het 
experiment in werkelijkheid over het indirect leren van grammaticale regels ging. De letterreeksen
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die ze moesten onthouden waren namelijk helemaal niet willekeurig samengesteld, maar gecreëerd 
op grond van onderliggende regels. Zowel tijdens als na afloop van de geheugentaak, vroegen we 
proefpersonen om te beoordelen of ze (nieuwe) letterreeksen als prettig of onprettig ervoeren. 
De proefpersonen lieten een duidelijke voorkeur zien voor letterreeksen die zich aan dezelfde 
regels hielden als degene die ze in de geheugentaak hadden geleerd. Ze waren zich echter niet 
bewust van het doel van het experiment, noch van de (correcte) grammaticale regels. We toonden 
hiermee aan dat er op grond van onbewuste informatie gehandeld kan worden (bijvoorbeeld door 
een voorkeur aangeven), zonder dat we ons bewust zijn van die kennis (of invloed) waarop we 
ons gedrag baseren. Zoals we voorspelden, was de invloed van onbewuste kennis op het gedrag 
kleiner, tot geheel afwezig, bij proefpersonen die hoger scoorden op de mindfulness vragenlijst. 
Dit suggereert dat mindfulness geassocieerd kan worden met een nonreactieve dispositie die de 
invloed van automatische reacties vermindert.
In het vierde hoofdstuk ontwikkelden we een experiment waarmee we metacognitief monitoren 
maten, het tweede concept dat ten grondslag ligt aan mindfulness. Tijdens mindfulness meditatie 
is het voor de meditator namelijk van cruciaal belang zich bewust te blijven van de locatie en de 
toestand van de aandacht. Middels het ontwikkelen van dit experiment hoopten we metacognitie 
van aandacht objectief vast te kunnen stellen. We beoogden dit te doen door te onderzoeken of 
de zelfrapportage van aandachtsfocus samenhangt met hersenmetingen die aandacht reflecteren. 
Omdat het object van aandacht tijdens mindfulness meditatie vaak het lichaam is (in het bijzonder, 
de ademhaling), richtte dit experiment zich op de metacognitie van de lichaamsaandacht. Het 
experiment verliep als volgt: Proefpersonen lagen op hun rug met hun ogen dicht en hun hoofd in 
de MEG helm. Ze werden door middel van verschillende geluiden geïnstrueerd om hun aandacht 
te richten op hun linker of rechter hand. Vervolgens werd hen gevraagd hun aandacht zo goed 
mogelijk bij de aangegeven hand te houden totdat, op een onverwacht moment, er een tweede 
geluid klonk. Met een druk op de knop gaven de proefpersonen vervolgens aan hoe goed ze 
dachten dat hun aandacht op dat moment op de aangegeven hand was gericht. Als objectieve maat 
van aandacht gebruikte we het niveau van alfa golven in de sensorische hersenschors: die gebieden 
waar het lichaam gerepresenteerd wordt en lichaamssensaties verwerkt worden. We vonden dat de 
zelfrapportage inderdaad correspondeerde met het niveau van alfa golven in hersengebieden van 
de desbetreffende hand.
In het vijfde hoofdstuk gebruiktte we het experiment dat we in het vierde hoofdstuk hadden 
ontwikkeld, om te onderzoeken of de beoefening van mindfulness meditatie ons beter in staat 
stelt accuraat over onze aandachtstoestand te rapporteren. Daartoe vergeleken we twee groepen 
meditatoren: de ene groep had enige meditatie ervaring (<1000 uur), terwijl de andere groep 
zeer ervaren was (3000 tot 30000 uur). We vonden een verrassend sterke overeenkomst tussen 
de resultaten van de eerste groep (de onervaren meditatoren) met de resultaten van de meditatie-
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naïeve proefpersonen uit de vorige studie. De2e replicatie laat niet alleen zien dat zowel het 
experiment als de analyse robuust zijn, maar suggereert ook dat enige meditatie-ervaring wellicht 
niet genoeg is om tot veranderingen in metacognitie te leiden. Bij zowel de proefpersonen uit de 
vorige studie, als bij de onervaren meditatoren in deze studie, correspondeerde de zelfrapportage 
met de hersentoestand direct voor de rapportage. Echter, bij de zeer ervaren meditatoren vonden 
we een ander patroon: hun zelfrapportage correspondeerde met de hersentoestand tijdens de 
gehele periode voorafgaand aan het moment van rapportage. Bovendien vonden we bij de 
ervaren meditatoren dat wanneer de aandacht als “slecht” gerapporteerd werd, de hersenactiviteit 
“gecompenseerd” leek te worden. Vervolgonderzoek is noodzakelijk om de betekenis van dit 
resultaat nader te verklaren. Echter, deze resultaten suggereren dat ervaren meditatoren in staat 
waren hun aandacht continue (i.a.w. proactief) te monitoren, terwijl de andere proefpersonen hun 
aandacht vooral achteraf evalueerde. De ervaren meditatoren leken daardoor in staat al tijdens 
de trial op te merken dat hun aandacht was verslapt, en ter compensatie hun aandacht weer aan 
te sterken. Dat de meditatoren deze trials nog steeds als “slecht” beoordeelden, suggereert echter 
ook dat deze extra moeite die deze compensatie kostte, werd meegenomen in hun zelfrapportage. 
Toekomstig onderzoek zal moeten uitwijzen of dit resultaat verklaard kan worden doordat de 
ervaren meditatoren de instructies anders interpreteerden, of dat ze daadwerkelijk in staat waren 
om niet alleen over hun aandachtstoestand, maar ook over hun aandachtscontrole te rapporteren.
In dit proefschrift werd gesteld dat non-reactiviteit en metacognitief monitoren essentiële 
concepten zijn om mindfulness (meditatie) te kunnen begrijpen; Van de historische oorsprong, 
tot aan de mechanismen die aan de basis liggen van de klinische en niet-klinische effecten. Hoewel 
het onderzoek zich richtte op non-reactiviteit, kan non-reactiviteit beschouwd worden als één 
eigenschap van een ruimere set ‘mindful attitudes’, zoals b.v. zelf-compassie. In dit proefschrift 
maakte we een conceptueel onderscheid tussen mindful attitudes en metacognitief monitoren. 
We kunnen echter een wederkerige relatie veronderstellen: Door middel van mindful attitudes 
wordt de meditator in staat gesteld metacognitief te monitoren - door bijvoorbeeld minder snel 
afgeleid te zijn door emotionele gebeurtenissen. Vice-versa, dankzij het vermogen metacognitief 
te monitoren, kunnen disfunctionele attitudes (b.v. kwaadheid en stress) geïdentificeerd worden en 
vervangen worden door meer mindful attitudes (b.v. minder reactief en beoordelend). Toekomstig 
onderzoek zal zich daarom dienen te richten op de relatie tussen deze twee cruciale aspecten van 
mindfulness. Conceptuele helderheid en een coherente terminologie zouden hierin een leidraad 
moeten zijn. We hebben geprobeerd in dit proefschrift hieraan een bijdrage te leveren. Het 
onderzoeken van de relatie tussen klinisch relevante attitudes en metacognitief monitoren zal 
daarmee kunnen helpen een brug te slaan tussen klinisch onderzoek, waarin onderzocht wordt 
welke attitudes klinisch relevant zijn en hoe ze ontwikkeld kunnen worden, en neurocognitief 
onderzoek, dat op zoek is naar mechanismen die aan de basis liggen van mindfulness.
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